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After	  reviewing	  the	  various	  definitions	  of	  international	  migration	  and	  refugee	  situations,	  the	  paper	  proposes	  a	  
general	   framework	   in	  which	  to	  capture	  the	  complex	  two-­‐way	  relationship	  between	  education	  and	  migration,	  
and	   its	   consequences	   on	  both	  migrants	   and	  non-­‐migrants	   in	   each	  of	   the	  origin	   and	  destination	   countries.	   It	  
successively	  reviews:	  the	  over-­‐education	  of	  migrants	  compared	  to	  non-­‐migrants	  and	  the	  selection	  processes	  at	  
play	  in	  origin	  and	  destination	  countries;	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  highly-­‐educated	  migration	  from	  developing	  to	  
developed	  countries	  and	  the	  inconclusive	  evidence	  regarding	  losses	  and	  gains	  for	  countries	  and	  individuals;	  the	  
different	   ways	   in	   which	   migration	   impacts	   the	   education	   of	   non-­‐migrant	   children	   in	   the	   origin	   countries	  
through	  financial,	  but	  also	  ideational	  remittances;	  the	  school	  performances	  of	  migrant	  children	  and	  the	  various	  
consequences	   of	   diversity	   in	   the	   classrooms	   for	   children	   of	   both	  migrant	   and	   local	   origin;	   	   the	   challenge	   of	  
educating	   refugee	   children	  and	  avoiding	   that	   a	  whole	   generation	  be	   lost.	   The	  paper	   concludes	  on	   the	  many	  




The	   universal	   spread	   of	   school	   education	   and	   the	   global	  migration	   of	   people	   are	   two	   facets	   of	   an	   era	   that	  
started	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Of	  course,	  both	  education	  and	  mobility	  had	  always	  existed,	  
but	   it	   is	   only	   with	   the	   worldwide	   advent	   of	   nation-­‐states	   in	   the	   post-­‐World	   War	   II	   period	   that	   education	  
became	  national	   and	   long-­‐distance	  migration	   international,	   and	  both	  passed	  under	   the	   control	  of	  new	   state	  
actors.	  	  The	  two	  trends	  are	  independent	  from	  each	  other,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  strongly	  connected	  by	  a	  web	  of	  
mutual	  causation.	  The	  convergence	  of	  school	  curricula	  and	  the	  resulting	  diffusion	  of	  shared	  knowledge	  around	  
the	   world	   represent	   the	   backdrop	   of	   increasing	   international	   migration.	   Indeed,	   on	   one	   hand	   persisting	   or	  
widening	  global	  divides	  in	  terms	  of	  wellbeing	  and	  access	  to	  resources	  (both	  economic	  and	  political)	  create	  the	  
motives	  for	  why	  people	  move	  across	  borders.	  And,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  narrowing	  divides	  in	  terms	  of	  access	  to	  
education	   provide	   them	   with	   knowledge	   and	   skills	   they	   can	   use	   anywhere.	   In	   brief,	   the	   reasons	   for	  
international	   migration	   and	   its	   feasibility	   have	   grown	   in	   parallel.	   	   Moreover,	   booming	   means	   of	  
communication,	   both	   virtual	   and	   real,	   have	   allowed	   the	   development	   of	   transnational	   networks	   and	   the	  
worldwide	  circulation	  of	  information	  that	  facilitate	  migration.	  But,	  first,	  what	  is	  international	  migration?	  
	  
	  
Defining	  Migration	  	  
Who	  is	  a	  migrant?	  The	  United	  Nations	  uses	  two	  distinct	  definitions	  for	  “international	  migrant”.	  The	  first	  applies	  
to	  the	  individual	  migrant,	  who	  is	  defined	  “as	  any	  person	  who	  changes	  his	  or	  her	  country	  of	  usual	  residence”.i	  
The	  second	  applies	  collectively	  to	  the	  migrant	  population	  and	  defines	  the	  “international	  migrant	  stock	  [as]	  the	  
number	  of	  people	  living	  in	  a	  country	  or	  area	  other	  than	  that	  in	  which	  they	  were	  born”.ii	  	  The	  two	  definitions	  are	  
not	   fully	  consistent	  with	  each	  other.	  Persons	  who	  return	  to	  their	  country	  of	  birth	  after	  a	  period	  of	  residence	  
abroad	   (an	   important	   category	   in	   countries	   affected	   by	   significant	  movements	   of	   temporary	   emigration,	   for	  
example	  the	  South-­‐Asian	  and	  Arab	  countries	  of	  origin	  for	  migrant	  workers	  in	  the	  Gulf	  States)	  are	  international	  
migrants	  according	  to	  the	   first	  definition,	  but	  not	   to	   the	  second.	  Another	  organisation,	   IOM,	  which	  has	  been	  












recognises	   foreign-­‐nationals	   instead	   of	   foreign-­‐born	   persons	   as	   immigrants.	   For	   the	   IOM,	   immigration	   is	   “a	  
process	  by	  which	  non-­‐nationals	  move	  into	  a	  country	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  settlement”.iii	  Using	  the	  two	  criteria	  of	  
country	  of	  birth	  and	  country	  of	  citizenship	  interchangeably	  generates	  conceptual	  ambiguities.	  
	  
Using	  the	  criterion	  of	  country	  of	  nationality,	  one	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  nationals	  and	  foreign-­‐nationals,	  a	  
dichotomy	  that	  does	  not	  correspond	  to	  actual	  cross-­‐border	  migration.	  Indeed,	  persons	  who	  have	  never	  moved	  
can	  be	  foreign-­‐nationals	  in	  the	  country	  where	  they	  were	  born	  and	  live:	  e.g.	  sons	  and	  daughters	  of	  Moroccan	  or	  
Turkish	  migrants	   in	   Germany	   before	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   1999	   code	   of	   nationality	   that	   introduced	   a	  
degree	  of	  jus	  soli;	  some	  250,000	  stateless	  persons	  in	  Kuwait,	  most	  of	  them	  the	  descendants	  of	  Bedouin	  tribes	  
moving	  from	  time	  immemorial	  across	  a	  desert	  spanning	  Kuwait,	  Iraq	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia.	  Symmetrically,	  persons	  
who	  have	  moved	   can	  be	  nationals	  of	   a	   country	  where	   they	  were	  not	  born,	  but	   in	  which	   they	   currently	   live:	  
naturalised	  immigrants	  and	  nationals	  born	  abroad	  who	  have	  migrated	  to	  their	  country	  of	  nationality.	  	  
	  
Using,	  instead,	  the	  country	  of	  birth	  criterion,	  one	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  natives	  and	  those	  born	  abroad.	  
Migrants	   are,	   then,	   persons	   born	   in	   a	   country	   different	   from	   that	  where	   they	   live.	   It	   is	   theoretically	   a	   non-­‐
ambiguous	  distinction	   as	   every	   individual	   has	  only	   one	   country	  of	   birth.	   But	   this	   is	   true	  only	   if	   international	  
borders	  do	  not	  move.	  Dividing	  a	  nation’s	  territory	  into	  smaller	  nations	  “creates”	  international	  migrants.	  So,	  for	  
example,	  persons	  born	  in	  Russia	  and	  residing	  in	  Uzbekistan,	  who	  were	  internal	  migrants	  at	  the	  time	  of	  USSR,	  
became	   international	   migrants	   once	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   collapsed.	   Uniting	   nations,	   meanwhile,	   into	   a	   single	  
territory	  “removes”	   international	  migrants.	  An	  example	  here	  might	  be	  persons	  who	  migrated	   from	  Sana’a	   to	  
Aden	  prior	  to	  1990	  and	  who	  ceased	  to	  be	   international	  migrants	  once	  the	  two	  Yemen	  became	  one	  nation	   in	  
1990.	  
	  
The	  two	  criteria	  of	  country	  of	  birth	  and	  country	  of	  nationality	  produce	  remarkably	  different	  estimates.	  Figure	  1	  
plots	  the	  ratio	  of	  foreign-­‐born	  persons	  to	  foreign-­‐nationals	  in	  the	  case	  of	  individuals	  originating	  from	  the	  MENA	  
region	  and	  residing	  in	  North	  America	  or	  Europe.	  This	  ratio	  varies	  from	  a	  high	  390%	  in	  Canada	  (100	  nationals	  of	  
a	  MENA	  country	  per	  390	  migrants	  born	  in	  a	  MENA	  country)	  to	  a	  low	  60%	  in	  Germany	  (100	  nationals	  of	  a	  MENA	  
country	  for	  60	  migrants	  born	  in	  a	  MENA	  country).	  Two	  main	  factors	  explain	  the	  difference	  between	  countries	  
of	  destination:	  first,	  the	  rate	  of	  nationality	  acquisition	  in	  the	  destination	  country	  by	  migrants	  (from	  the	  highest	  
in	  Canada	  to	  the	  lowest	  in	  Germany);	  and	  second,	  the	  principle	  governing	  nationality	  at	  birth	  (from	  dominant	  
jus	  soli	  to	  dominant	  jus	  sanguinis).	  
	  
Who	  is	  a	  refugee?	  A	  refugee	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  1951	  Refugee	  Convention	  as	  “any	  person	  who	  […]	  owing	  to	  well-­‐
founded	   fear	  of	  being	  persecuted	   for	   reasons	  of	   race,	   religion,	  nationality,	  membership	  of	  a	  particular	   social	  
group	   or	   political	   opinion,	   is	   outside	   the	   country	   of	   his	   nationality	   and	   is	   unable	   or,	   owing	   to	   such	   fear,	   is	  
unwilling	  to	  avail	  himself	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  that	  country;	  or	  who,	  not	  having	  a	  nationality	  and	  being	  outside	  
the	   country	   of	   his	   former	   habitual	   residence	   as	   a	   result	   of	   such	   events,	   is	   unable	   or,	   owing	   to	   such	   fear,	   is	  
unwilling	  to	  return	  to	  it.”iv	  
	  
A	   different	   definition	   applies	   to	   Palestine	   refugees	  who	   are	   “persons	  whose	   normal	   place	   of	   residence	  was	  
Palestine	  during	  the	  period	  1	  June	  1946	  to	  15	  May	  1948,	  and	  who	  lost	  both	  home	  and	  means	  of	  livelihood	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  1948	  conflict	  […]	  The	  descendants	  of	  Palestine	  refugee	  males,	  including	  adopted	  children,	  are	  also	  














Figure	   1:	   Ratio	   of	   foreign	   born	   to	   non-­‐citizens	   among	  migrants	   originating	   from	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	   North	  
Africa	  in	  selected	  countries	  of	  destination	  
	  	  
Source:	  Philippe	  Fargues	  2014,	  The	  fuzzy	  lines	  of	  international	  migration:	  a	  critical	  assessment	  of	  definitions	  and	  estimates	  in	  the	  Arab	  




Are	  refugees	  migrants?	  	  Most	  1951	  Convention	  -­‐	  or	  UNHCR	  -­‐	  refugees	  were	  born	  in	  their	  country	  of	  nationality	  
and	   are	   international	   migrants	   in	   their	   country	   of	   asylum.	   But	   some	   of	   them	   are	   not	   (e.g.	   those	   sons	   and	  
daughters	  of	  refugees	  born	  in	  exile;	  youngest	  age	  groups	  of	  populations	  in	  protracted	  refugee	  situations;	  etc.).	  
By	  contrast,	  most	  Palestinian	  refugees	  are	  not	  themselves	  international	  migrants,	  but	  children	  or	  grandchildren	  
of	  migrants.	  According	  to	  the	  countries	  where	  they	  reside,	  they	  can	  be	  second	  or	  third	  generation	  non-­‐citizens	  
(e.g.	   Lebanon)	   or	   citizens	   (e.g.	   Jordan).	   While	   the	   population	   of	   UNHCR	   refugees	   can	   decrease	   or	   increase	  
depending	   on	   circumstances,	   the	   population	   of	   Palestine	   refugees	   under	   the	  mandate	   of	   UNRWA	   increases	  






Table	  1:	  Migrant	  and	  refugee	  stocks	  by	  level	  of	  development	  of	  the	  destination	  country-­‐	  End	  of	  2015	  




























classification)	   Number	   %	   Number	   %	  
Developed	  regions	   	  140	  481	  955	   57.6%	   	  2	  206	  033	   13.7%	  
Developing	  regions	   	  103	  218	  281	   42.4%	   	  13	  915	  394	   86.3%	  
Total	   	  243	  700	  236	   100.0%	   	  16	  121	  427	   100.0%	  
Sources:	   1)	  Migrants:	   United	  Nations,	   Department	   of	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Affairs,	   Population	   Division	   (2015),	   rends	   in	  
International	   Migrant	   Stock:	   Migrants	   by	   Age	   and	   Sex	   (United	   Nations	   database,	   POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015)	   ;	   2)	  
Refugees:	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees,	  Global	  Report	  2015,	  http://www.unhcr.org/gr15/index.xml	  	  
	  
	  
Migrants	  choose	  their	  destination,	  while	  refugees	  do	  not.	  As	  a	  general	  rule,	  voluntary	  migrants	  go	  to	  wealthier	  
countries	  than	  their	  own.	  The	  move	  can	  be	  South-­‐North,	  South-­‐South	  or	  North-­‐North,	  to	  use	  meaningless	  but	  
popular	  categories.	  Their	  destination	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  neighbour.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  refugees	  move	  from	  lack	  
of	  choice.	   	  They	  hope	  to	  return	  to	  their	  homes	  and	  find	  shelter	  in	  the	  vicinity,	  often	  on	  just	  the	  other	  side	  of	  
their	   country’s	  border,	  even	   if	   their	  neighbour	   is	   itself	   a	   large	  migrant	   sending	   country	   (e.g:	  Afghans	   in	   Iran,	  
Somalis	  in	  Sudan,	  etc.).	  Since,	  in	  recent	  times,	  most	  refugee-­‐producing	  situations	  have	  occurred	  in	  developing	  
countries,	   which	   themselves	   happen	   to	   border	   other	   developing	   countries,	   there	   is	   a	   specialisation	   in	  
destination	   countries	   according	   to	   their	   level	   of	   development:	   most	   refugees	   are	   hosted	   by	   developing	  
countries	  and	  most	  economic	  migrants	  by	  developed	  countries	  (Table	  1).	  This	  distinction	  has	  consequences	  on	  
education	  opportunities	  created	  or	  removed	  by	  international	  mobility.	  
	  
	  
The	  Education	  and	  Migration	  Interaction	  Framework	  
Education	  and	  migration	  are	   linked	  by	  a	   complex	   two-­‐way	   relationship	  with	  consequences	  on	  both	  migrants	  
and	  non-­‐migrants	  in	  each	  of	  the	  origin	  and	  destination	  countries,	  as	  schematised	  on	  Table	  2	  below.	  
	  
The	   first	   kind	   of	   interaction	   consists	   of	   the	   various	   direct	   and	   indirect	   impacts	   that	   education	   produces	   on	  
migration.	   Education	   is	   universally	   recognised	   as	   a	   driver	   of	  migration	   as	   it	   creates	   openness	   to,	   as	  well	   as	  
opportunities	   for,	   employment	   abroad.	   There	   is	  worldwide	  evidence	   that	   the	  more	  educated	   the	  higher	   the	  
probability	  of	  migrating,	  and	  consequently	  the	  typical	  migrant	  is	  more	  educated	  than	  the	  average	  person	  left	  
behind	  in	  the	  original	  population	  [cell	  1	  on	  Table	  2].	  	  
	  
The	   over-­‐emigration	   of	   individuals	   with	   an	   above-­‐average	   level	   of	   education	   has	   consequences	   on	   the	  
education	   of	   non-­‐migrants	   in	   the	   origin	   country,	   but	   in	   which	   direction	   is	   a	   much-­‐debated	   matter:	   does	   it	  
deprive	  the	  source	  country	  of	  a	  scarce	  resource	  (a	  mechanism	  often	  called	  “brain	  drain”)	  thereby	  hampering	  
economic	   development	   and	   further	   harming	   the	   progress	   of	   education,	   or	   are	   there	   compensatory	  
mechanisms?	  	  Moreover,	  educated	  migrants	  have	  been	  found	  to	  convey	  values	  and	  models	  to	  their	  country	  of	  
origin	   that	  are	  susceptible	   to	   impact	  development,	   through	  a	  mechanism	  of	   social,	  or	   ideational	   remittances	  













Looking	  at	  what	  happens	  at	   the	  other	  end	  of	   the	  process,	   in	   the	  destination	   country,	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	  
migrants’	   education	   attainment	   and	   skills	   are	   not	   always	   matched	   by	   their	   actual	   occupation	   and	   that	  
investment	  in	  human	  capital	  has	  partly	  been	  wasted	  through	  migration	  [cell	  5	  on	  Table	  2].	  	  
	  
A	  subsidiary	  question	  relates	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  highly-­‐educated	  migrants	  on	  natives	  in	  the	  destination	  country,	  
in	  terms	  of	  competition	  and	  emulation	  on	  the	  labour	  market,	  but	  also	  in	  education	  and	  research	  institutions.	  
Do	   educated	  migrants	   create	   unemployment	   among	   nationals	  with	   a	   comparable	   level	   of	   education?	  Or	   do	  
they	  fill	  gaps	   in	  the	   labour	  market	  that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  remained	  vacant	   for	   lack	  of	  nationals	  with	  the	  
necessary	   skills?	   Does	   education	   create	   specific	   synergies	   between	   national	   and	   foreign-­‐national	  workforce,	  
and	  with	  what	  results?	  [cell	  7	  on	  Table	  2].	  	  
	  
Instead,	  the	  second	  kind	  of	  interaction	  consists	  of	  the	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  migration	  impacts	  education	  in	  both	  
the	  origin	  and	  destination	  populations.	  Not	  all	  migrants	  settle	  for	  a	  lifetime	  in	  the	  destination	  country	  and	  part	  
of	  them	  return	  to	  their	  homeland.	  Return	  migrants	  always	  bring	  back	  to	  their	  home	  country	  an	  experience,	  and	  
often	  an	  education,	   that	   they	   and	   their	   born-­‐abroad	   sons	   and	  daughters	  have	   gained	   in	   the	  host	   country,	   a	  
mechanism	  by	  which	   international	  migration	  contributes	   to	  building	  human	  capital	   in	   the	  countries	  of	  origin	  
[cell	  2	  on	  Table	  2].	  	  
	  
Table	  2:	  The	  web	  of	  mutual	  causation	  between	  Education	  and	  Migration	  	  
Concerned	  population	   I	  -­‐	  Education	  →	  Migration	   II	  -­‐	  Migration→	  Education	  
Origin	  
country	  
Migrants	   1	  
	  Education,	  a	  driver	  of	  migration	  	  
2	  
Education	   gained	   abroad	   then	  





Development	   consequences	   of	  
highly-­‐educated	   migration	   (“brain	  
drain”	  vs.	  ideational	  remittances)	  
4	  
Migrant	   remittances'	   impact	   on	  
education	   in	   the	  homeland;	  parent’s	  
absence	   impact	   on	   education;	  
prospect	  of	   emigration,	   an	   incentive	  




Migrants	   5	  
Over-­‐qualification	   of	   migrants	  
(“brain	  waste”)	  
6	  
School	   performances	   of	   migrants’	  
sons	   and	   daughters;	   student	   (and	  
teachers’)	  migration;	  development	  of	  















	  Competition	   and	   emulation	  
between	  natives	  and	  migrants	  
8	  
Diversity	   of	   origins	   in	   the	   classroom	  
and	   the	   quality	   of	   education;	  
enrolment	   of	   locals	   in	   foreign	  





Another	   aspect	   is	   the	   role	   of	   emigration	   on	   the	   education	   of	   children	   in	   the	   origin	   country.	   Three	   channels	  
must	  be	  considered	  in	  this	  framework:	  remittances	  and	  direct	  investments	  made	  by	  migrants	  in	  their	  country	  
of	  origin	  (to	  what	  extent	  do	  they	  contribute	  to	  building	  human	  capital	  in	  home	  countries,	  from	  money	  spent	  on	  
the	  education	  of	  their	  own	  children	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  education	  institutions	  to	  serve	  their	  community?);	  	  	  
psychological	  and	  often	  negative	  consequences	  of	  a	  parent’s	  absence	  on	  the	  enrolment	  and	  success	  at	  school	  
of	  children	  left	  at	  home;	  and	  finally	  the	  spill-­‐over	  effect	  that	  	  educated	  migrants’	  success	  abroad	  produces	  on	  
the	  wish	  to	  acquire	  education	  at	  home,	  often	  called	  “brain	  gain”	  [cell	  4	  on	  Table	  2].	  
	  
In	  the	  destination	  country,	  migration	  affects	  the	  education	  of	  migrants’	  sons	  and	  daughters	  in	  several	  ways	  (do	  
those	  enrolled	  in	  local	  schools	  suffer	  a	  handicap	  due	  to	  the	  teaching	  language?	  Has	  immigration	  favoured	  the	  
creation	  of	   foreign	  schools?	  Etc.).	  Moreover,	  education	   is	   increasingly	  a	  cause	  of	  migration	  and	   international	  
students	  (and	  teachers,	  researchers,	  etc.)	  comprise	  a	  growing	  share	  of	  global	  migrants	  [cell	  6	  on	  Table	  2].	  	  
	  
Finally,	   immigration	   may	   affect	   the	   education	   of	   local	   students	   by	   the	   diversity	   of	   origins	   and	   the	   spoken	  
languages	  it	  brings	  to	  the	  classroom,	  but	  also	  through	  the	  possibility	  it	  offers	  them	  to	  attend	  foreign	  schools	  in	  
the	  places	  where	  migrant	  communities	  or	  their	  states	  of	  origin	  have	  opened	  such	  schools.	  What	  is	  the	  impact	  
of	  foreign	  students	  attending	  national	  schools	  (or	  universities)	  on	  school	  performances	  and	  ultimately	  on	  the	  
human	  capital	  of	  the	  host	  country?	  Also,	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  foreign	  schools,	  created	  for	  those	  not	  enrolled	  in	  
national	  schools,	  contribute	  to	  human	  capital	  formation	  in	  the	  host	  country?	  [cell	  8	  on	  Table	  2]	  
	  
Before	  addressing	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  above	  issues,	  a	  word	  must	  be	  said	  about	  education	  and	  migration	  in	  the	  
individuals’	  life	  cycle.	  Age	  patterns	  of	  international	  migration	  exhibit	  striking	  regularities	  over	  time	  and	  space,	  a	  
fact	   that	   no	   theory	   has	   ever	   tried	   to	   explain	   despite	   several	   demographers	   developing	   mathematical	  
expressions	   for	  migration	   rates	   by	   age.	   In	   a	   variety	   of	   national	   contexts	   and	  periods,	   the	   same	  bimodal	   age	  
distribution	  of	  flows	  of	  international	  migrants	  at	  the	  time	  of	  first	  migration	  is	  observed.	  International	  migration	  
peaks	  twice:	  below	  5	  years	  and	  around	  25	  years	  (Figure	  2).	  The	  first	  and	  lowest	  peak	  corresponds	  to	  dependent	  
children	   migrating	   or	   later	   reuniting	   with	   their	   parents,	   and	   the	   second	   and	   highest	   peak	   to	   autonomous	  
migrants	  (labour	  migrants,	  family	  members	  or	  students,	  etc.).	  	  
	  













	   	  
Source	  of	  the	  data:	  United	  Nations,	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs,	  Population	  Division.	  World	  Marriage	  Data	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For	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  present	  paper,	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	  stress	   that	  a	   large	  proportion	  of	  migrants	  arrive	  at	  a	  
destination	   when	   they	   are	   at	   pre-­‐school,	   school	   or	   university	   ages.	   In	   the	   European	   Union,	   a	   majority	   of	  
migrants	   fall	   into	   this	   category:	   53.02%	   of	   the	   2,425,977	   immigrants	   entered	   in	   2010	   (most	   recent	   year	  
available	  for	  all	  28	  EU	  member	  states	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing)	  were	  below	  28	  years	  of	  age	  at	  arrival	   (Table	  3).	  
Looking	   at	   the	   reasons	   for	   legal	   immigration	   into	   the	   EU28,	   students	   represented	   close	   to	   one	   fifth	   of	   all	  
immigrants	  in	  2015	  (almost	  the	  same	  proportion	  as	  workers)	  not	  taking	  into	  account	  all	  the	  younger	  students	  
that	   entered	   through	   a	   family	   reunion	   visa	   (more	   than	   one	   third	   of	   all	   entries).	   These	   facts	   are	   too	   often	  
overlooked	  in	  several	  policy	  debates	  surrounding	  migration	  and	  education,	  from	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘brain	  drain’	  to	  
school	  performance	  of	  students	  with	  a	  migrant	  background.	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Distribution	  of	  migrant	  flows	  in	  the	  EU28	  in	  2010	  by	  broad	  age	  groups	  
Age	  groups	   Percentage	  of	  migrants	  
0-­‐4	  years	  =	  Preschool	   4,75%	  
5-­‐9	  years	  =	  Elementary	  school	   3,56%	  
10-­‐14	  years	  =	  Middle	  school	   3,42%	  
15-­‐18	  years	  =	  High	  school	   4,86%	  
19-­‐27	  years	  =	  University	   36,43%	  
28	  years	  &	  over=	  Education	  completed	   46,98%	  
Source:	  EUROSTAT	  Data	  
	  
Table	  4:	  First	  permits	  of	  residence	  by	  reasons	  in	  the	  EU28,	  2008-­‐2015	  
Reasons	   Number	  	   %	  
Family	  	   4.536.282	   35,7%	  
Education	  	   2.443.391	   19,2%	  
Remunerated	  activities	   2.661.748	   20,9%	  
Other	   3.069.620	   24,1%	  




Education	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  migration	  
International	  migrants	  constitute	  only	  3.5%	  of	  the	  world’s	  population.	  They	  are	  a	  small	  minority	  and	  not	  at	  all	  a	  
randomly	  selected	  one:	  those	  who	  voluntarily	  leave	  their	  country	  are	  usually	  among	  the	  fittest,	  physically	  and	  
intellectually.	  In	  such	  sense,	  they	  are	  exceptional	  people.vi	  Today,	  formal	  education	  has	  become	  an	  increasingly	  
important	   criterion	   of	   selection,	   either	   by	   migration	   laws	   of	   destination	   countries	   (for	   example	   when	   they	  












attained	   by	   migrants	   is	   higher	   than	   that	   of	   their	   population	   of	   origin.	   In	   the	   238	   countries	   in	   which	   the	  
distribution	  by	  educational	   level	   is	   available	   for	  both	   the	   resident	  population	  and	   the	   country’s	  migrants	   (to	  
OECD	  destinations	  only),	  the	  percentage	  of	  over	  25s	  with	  tertiary-­‐level	  education	  (ISCED	  5	  of	  higher)	  is	  in	  most	  
cases	  higher	  among	  migrants	  than	  in	  their	  population	  of	  origin	  (dots	  situated	  above	  the	  diagonal	  on	  Figure	  3).vii	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Population	  that	  has	  at	   least	  completed	  short-­‐cycle	  tertiary	   (ISCED	  5	  or	  higher)	  amongst	  natives	  and	  
migrants	  in	  OECD	  countries	  25+	  years,	  both	  sexes,	  ca.	  2010	  
	  
Source	  of	  the	  data:	  UNESCO	  and	  OECD	  (see	  Annex	  A)	  
	  
	  
Not	  only	  are	  migrants	  more	  educated	  than	  non-­‐migrants	  in	  the	  origin	  country,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  more	  educated	  
than	  natives	   in	   the	  destination	  country	   (Figure	  4).	   	   This	   last	   remark	  also	  applies	   to	   countries	  not	   included	   in	  
Figure	   4.	   	   In	   South	   Africa,	   for	   example,	   immigrants	   have	   a	   significantly	   higher	   level	   of	   education	   than	   non-­‐
migrants:	   34.8%	   have	   received	   secondary	   or	   tertiary	   education	   against	   30.0%.viii	   In	   Singapore,	   it	   varies	  
according	   to	   the	  national	  origin	  of	  migrants:	   those	   from	  Malaysia	  have	  a	   lower	   level	  of	  education	   than	  non-­‐
migrants,	  while	  those	  from	  China	  and	  other	  nationalities	  have	  a	  higher	  level	  (Figure	  5).	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Population	  aged	  25	  years	  and	  over	  with	   tertiary-­‐level	  education	   (ISCED	  5	  or	  higher)	  among	  natives	  















































































Figure	   5:	   Singapore	   2010	   -­‐	   Resident	   population	   aged	  15	   years	   and	  over	   by	   country	   of	   birth	   and	   educational	  
attainment	  
	  




Before	   discussing	   the	   consequences	   of	   migrants’	   education	   on	   the	   sending	   and	   receiving	   economies	   and	  
societies,	   a	   preliminary	   question	   must	   be	   asked.	   What	   is	   most	   significant	   when	   explaining	   the	   educational	  
profile	  of	  migrants:	  the	  country	  where	  they	  come	  from	  or	  where	  they	  go?	  Let	  us	  take	  migrants	  originating	  from	  
Algeria	  and	  Mexico	  as	  a	   first	  example.	  Who	  are	   the	  migrants	  with	  the	  highest	   level	  of	  education?	  Asking	  the	  
same	  question	  to	  two	  informed	  observers,	  one	  based	  in	  France	  and	  the	  other	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  one	  would	  
obtain	  opposite	  answers;	   the	  first	  explaining	  that	  Algerian	  migrants	  typically	  belong	  to	  the	  working	  class	  and	  
have	   a	   low	   level	   of	   education	   while	   Mexican	   migrants,	   in	   smaller	   numbers,	   occupy	   highly-­‐skilled	   positions	  
requiring	  more	  education;	  and	  the	  second	  describing	  exactly	  the	  opposite,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  Algeria	  and	  Mexico	  
as	  sources	  of	  respectively	  highly	  and	  poorly	  educated	  migrants	  (Table	  5).	  Turning	  now	  to	  observers	  based	  in	  the	  
origin	   countries	   and	   asking	   them	  which	  destination	   is	   good	   for	  which	   level	   of	   skills,	   one	  would	   again	  obtain	  
contradictory	   responses:	  Algerians	  would	  view	  France	  as	  a	  destination	   for	   the	   low-­‐skilled	  and	   the	  US	   for	   the	  
high-­‐skilled,	  while	  Mexicans	  would	  express	  the	  exact	  opposite	  views.	  Looking	  at	  geography,	  one	  is	  tempted	  to	  
conclude	  that	  what	  matters	  is	  not	  the	  origin	  or	  the	  destination	  country	  as	  much	  as	  how	  distant	  or	  close	  they	  
are	  in	  geographic	  terms.	  Low-­‐skilled	  migration	  would	  be	  regional	  and	  high-­‐skilled	  migration	  global.	  Things	  are	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Table	   5:	   Distribution	   of	   migrant	   stocks	   aged	   25-­‐64	   years	   by	   educational	   attainment,	  
origin	  and	  destination	  ca.	  2010	  
Educational	  attainment	   France	   United	  States	  
Algeria	   Mexico	   Algeria	   Mexico	  
ISCED	  0/1/2	   54,1%	   14,5%	   12,9%	   71,3%	  
ISCED	  3/4	   35,0%	   34,9%	   37,9%	   25,3%	  
ISCED	  5/6	   10,9%	   50,5%	   49,2%	   3,4%	  
Source	  of	  the	  data:	  OECD	  
	  
India	  shares	  no	   land	  or	   sea	  border	  with	  any	  part	  of	  Europe,	  a	   fact	   that	  could	  make	   India-­‐to-­‐EU	  migration	  an	  
arduous	  endeavour.	  Apart	   from	  geography,	  however,	  other	   kinds	  of	  proximity	   create	   links	   that	   facilitate	   the	  
move.	  Historical	  proximity	  and	  sharing	  a	  language	  explain	  why	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  hosts	  a	  sizeable	  population	  
of	  Indian	  migrants.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Italy,	  which	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  destination	  for	  Indians	  in	  the	  EU,	  it	  is	  instead	  
the	   proximity	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   labour	  markets	   function	   -­‐-­‐	   with	   a	  multitude	   of	   informal,	   small-­‐	   or	  mid-­‐sized	  
industries	   in	   Italy	   just	   as	   in	   India-­‐-­‐	   that	   allows	  easy	  migration	  despite	   the	  absence	  of	  historical	   links	   and	   the	  
language	  barrier.	  Moreover,	  these	  two	  European	  countries	  of	  destination	  greatly	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  nationality	  
laws.	   In	   the	   UK,	   naturalisation	   is	   the	   normal	   outcome	   of	   long-­‐term	   residency	   and	   the	   predominant	   jus	   soli	  
incorporates	  most	  second-­‐generation	  migrants	  in	  the	  citizenry,	  while	  in	  Italy	  access	  to	  citizenship	  is	  exceptional	  
for	  migrants	  and	  difficult	  for	  their	  locally	  born	  children	  due	  to	  unmitigated	  jus	  sanguinis.	  
All	  the	  above	  differences	  combine	  to	  explain	  why	  so	  many	  Indian	  migrants	  have	  tertiary	  level	  education	  in	  the	  















































Source:	  Fargues	  P.	  and	  K.	  Lum	  2014,	   India-­‐EU	  Migration.	  A	  Relationship	  with	  Untapped	  Potential,	  CARIM-­‐India	  Research	  
Report	  2014/01,	  25	  p.	  http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/31305	  
	  
	  
Moreover,	   in	   the	   UK,	   the	   recently	   adopted	   points	   system,	   which	   along	   with	   other	   criteria	   includes	   an	  
assessment	  of	  competence	  in	  the	  English	  language,	  knowledge	  and	  skills,	  explains	  how	  the	  more	  educated	  the	  
migrant,	  the	  more	  likely	  they	  will	  be	  granted	  first	  a	  residence	  permit	  and	  later	  British	  citizenship.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  
Italy	  the	  employment-­‐based	  admission	  policy	  provides	  only	  residency	  status	  to	  migrants	  with	  an	  employment	  
contract	  with	  no	  or	   little	  prospect	  of	   acceding	   citizenship.	   In	   these	   two	  countries,	  migration	   serves	  different	  
strategies	  of	  human	  capital	  building.	  In	  the	  UK,	  the	  points	  system	  (as	  well	  as	  a	  policy	  of	  educating	  international	  
students	   in	   British	   world-­‐class	   universities)	   positions	   the	   country	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	   “global	   competition	   for	  
talents”ix	   	   in	   order	   to	   attract	   the	   “best	   and	   brightest”	   from	   abroad.	   In	   Italy,	   the	   employment-­‐based	   system	  
brings	   from	   abroad	   those	   who	   will	   do	   the	   three-­‐D	   (dirty,	   dangerous	   and	   demeaning)	   jobs	   that	   citizens	   no	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The	  brain	  drain-­‐brain	  waste-­‐brain	  gain	  debate	  
The	  international	  migration	  of	  people	  with	  tertiary-­‐level	  education	  is	  a	  massive	  and	  controversial	  phenomenon.	  
Many	   policymakers	   in	   origin	   countries	   and	   development	   experts	   in	   international	   agencies	   tend	   to	   see	   the	  
emigration	   of	   highly-­‐educated	   persons	   as	   brain	   drain	   or	   as	   a	   brain	   flight,	   depending	   on	   whether	   they	   put	  
forward	  the	  pull	  effect	  of	  the	  destination	  countries	  or	  the	  free	  choice	  of	  the	  migrants.	  Those	  denouncing	  the	  
brain	  drain	  see	  developing	  countries	  as	  victims	  of	  more	  advanced	  predator	  economies,	  while	  those	  blaming	  a	  
brain	   flight	   point	   towards	   collective	   interests	   being	   sacrificed	   to	   private	   ambitions.	   Reality	   may	   be	   more	  
complex	  however.	  
	  
Migration	   statistics	   by	   country	   of	   origin	   and	   level	   of	   education	   are	   only	   available	   in	   OECD	   countries	   of	  
destination	  and	  a	   few	  others.	  They	  do	  not	  provide	  a	   full,	  global	  picture	  of	   the	  emigration	  of	  highly	  educated	  
people.	   	   Indeed,	   while	   OECD	   countries	   are	   the	   destination	   for	   most	   migrants	   from	   certain	   countries	   (for	  
example	  from	  Mexico	  and	  Morocco	  whose	  migrants	  are	  mostly	  destined	  for	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  respectively),	  it	  
is	  not	   the	  case	   for	  other	  countries	  whose	  migrants	  go	  primarily	   to	  non-­‐OECD	  destinations	   (for	  example	   India	  
and	   Egypt	   from	   where	   they	   mostly	   go	   to	   the	   Gulf	   States).	   If,	   as	   we	   have	   already	   noted,	   the	   educational	  
distribution	   of	  migrants	   of	   a	   same	  origin	   varies	  with	   their	   destination,	   then	   data	   discussed	   below	   represent	  
only	  a	  partial	  vision	  of	  the	  reality.	  	  
	  
Focusing	  on	  OECD	  countries	  of	  destination,	  which	  are	  amongst	  the	  richest	  in	  the	  world,	  a	  striking	  fact	  emerges	  
from	   Table	   6	   and	   Figure	   7:	   the	   proportion	   of	   a	   given	   origin	   country’s	   migrants	   who	   have	   tertiary-­‐level	  
education	   is	   independent	   from	   the	   level	   of	   income	   of	   that	   country.	   Put	   in	   other	   terms,	   low-­‐income,	   low-­‐
education	  countries	  are	  a	  source	  of	  highly-­‐educated-­‐migrant	  flows	  to	  the	  OECD	  in	  the	  same	  proportion	  as	  high-­‐
income,	   high-­‐level	   education	   countries.	   	   Apparently,	   less	   developed	   countries	   lose	   a	   scarce	   resource	   to	   the	  
benefit	  of	  more	  developed	  countries,	  a	  phenomenon	  commonly	  described	  as	   ‘brain	  drain’.	  But	  what	  are	   the	  
terms	   of	   the	   debate?	   There	   are	   economic	   and	   ethical	   arguments,	   as	   well	   as	   an	   overall	   deficit	   of	   accurate	  
knowledge.	  
	  
Table	  6:	  Migrants	  with	  tertiary	  education	  in	  the	  OECD	  and	  income	  of	  the	  origin	  country	  
Level	  of	  income	  per	  capita*	   Migrants	   in	   the	  OECD	  with	  
tertiary	   education,	   25	  
years+	  (ISCED5+)	  
Number	   Percentage	  
of	  migrants	  
1st	  Quintile	  (l<	  $2,900)	   1,229,861	   32.9%	  
2nd	  Quintile	  ($2,900	  -­‐	  $7,900)	   3,425,430	   29.0%	  
3rd	  Quintile	  ($7,900	  -­‐	  $14,900)	   2,882,143	   29.6%	  
4th	  Quintile	  ($14,900	  -­‐	  31,900)	   2,810,036	   27.6%	  
5th	  Quintile	  (>$31,900)	   11,964,501	   36.7%	  
*	  2015	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  PPP	  (constant	  2011	  international	  $)	  














Figure	  7:	  Migrant	  to	  the	  OECD	  with	  tertiary	  education	  and	  income	  of	  the	  origin	  country	  in	  2015	  
Source	   of	   the	   data:	   GDP	   World	  
Development	   Indicators,	   1	   February	   2017	   http://data.worldbank.org/data-­‐catalog/world-­‐development-­‐
indicators	  ;	  Migrant	  stock	  OECD	  (see	  Annex	  A)	  
	  
	  
From	  an	  economic	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  international	  migration	  of	  highly	  educated	  people	  has	  both	  negative	  and	  
positive	  aspects.	  On	  the	  negative	  side,	  a	  first	  authoritative	  argument	  is	  that	  university	  graduates	  are	  a	  scarce	  
resource	  in	  poor	  countries,	  paid	  in	  part	  or	  in	  totality	  by	  public	  funds	  (the	  state	  finances	  public	  education).	  Their	  
emigration	  amounts	  to	  a	  transfer	  of	  wealth	  with	  no	  compensation	  to	  rich	  countries;	   in	  other	  terms	  a	  kind	  of	  
reverse	  aid	  to	  development.	  It	  represents	  a	  loss	  for	  the	  national	  economy	  because	  the	  country	  needs	  high-­‐level	  
skills	   for	   its	   long-­‐term	  development.	   It	   is	   also	   a	   loss	   for	   the	   family	   if	   highly	   educated	  migrants	   have	   a	   lower	  
propensity	   to	   return	   to	   their	   country	  of	  origin,	   and	  a	   loss	   for	   the	   local	   community	   that	  will	  miss	   the	  various	  
positive	  spill-­‐overs	  that	  highly-­‐educated	  workers	  can	  produce	  locally.	  Finally,	  it	  is	  a	  loss	  for	  the	  country’s	  good	  
governance	  as	  the	  more	  educated	  bring	  a	  stronger	  contribution	  to	  institution-­‐building.	  	  	  
	  
On	  the	  positive	  side,	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  highly-­‐educated	  workers	  earn	  a	  higher	  income	  in	  rich	  countries;	  a	  fact	  
which	   will	   benefit	   both	   the	   migrant	   and	   those	   left	   behind	   through	   higher	   amounts	   remitted.	   Moreover,	  
successful	  migrants	   become	   an	   example	   for	   their	   fellow	   citizens	   inciting	   them	   to	   invest	   in	   education	   if	   they	  
hope	  to	  migrate	  themselves.	  The	  brain	  drain	   is	   turned	   into	  a	  brain	  gain	  since	  not	  all	   the	  highly	  educated	  will	  
have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  emigrate.x	  Finally,	  not	  all	  migrants	  will	  stay	  abroad	   indefinitely	  and	  those	  who	  return	  
(temporarily	   or	   permanently)	   bring	   back	   some	   of	   the	   benefits	   of	   their	   migration	   experience	   in	   terms	   of	  















































thousands	   of	   Indian	   engineers	   circulating	   between	   Silicon	   Valley	   where	   they	   strengthen	   their	   skills	   and	  
business	  or	  scientific	  networks,	  and	  Bangalore	  where	  they	  develop	  one	  of	  India’s	  most	  brilliant	  sectors.xi	  
	  
Empirical	  evidence	  has	  accumulated	  in	  recent	  years	  to	  support,	  or	  eliminate,	  several	  of	  the	  above	  arguments.	  A	  
first	  question	  addresses	  money:	  do	  highly	  educated	  migrants	  remit	  less	  or	  more?	  There	  are	  arguments	  for	  the	  
former.	  First,	   these	  migrants	  come	  from	  wealthier	   families	  who	  do	  not	  count	  on	  remittances	  as	  much	  as	  the	  
poor	   families	   of	   low-­‐educated	   migrants.	   Second,	   they	   have	   more	   opportunities	   to	   stay	   in	   the	   destination	  
countries	  and	  therefore	  less	  reasons	  to	   invest	   in	  the	  origin	  countries.	  Such	  a	  view	  is	  apparently	  confirmed	  by	  
the	  negative	  correlation	  found	  at	  macro	  level	  between	  the	  average	  education	  level	  of	  outward	  migrant	  stocks	  
and	  the	  total	  volume	  of	   inward	  remittances.xii	  However,	  analyses	  at	  micro	   level	  making	   it	  possible	  to	  directly	  
link	   the	  migrant’s	   remittance	  decision	  with	  his	  or	  her	  education,	   find	  more	  mitigated	   results.	  According	   to	  a	  
2009	  study,	  migrants	  with	  a	  university	  degree	  would	   remit	  on	  average	  US$300	  more	  per	  year	   than	  migrants	  
without	   a	   university	   degree.xiii	   	   In	   the	   same	   vein,	   a	   micro-­‐analysis	   of	   data	   from	   five	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   African	  
countries	  found	  that	  migrants’	  education	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  their	  propensity	  to	  remit,	  but	  a	  significantly	  positive	  
effect	  on	   the	  amount	   sent	  by	   those	  who	   remit.	   Indeed,	  highly-­‐skilled	  migrants	   tend	   to	  earn	  higher	   incomes,	  
tend	  to	  be	  legally	  employed	  and	  therefore	  tend	  to	  have	  bank	  accounts	  allowing	  low-­‐cost	  money	  transfers.xiv	  	  
	  
A	  second	  question	  regards	  human	  capital:	  does	  highly-­‐educated	  migration	  produce	  a	  net	  depleting	  effect	  or	  is	  
this	   offset	   by	   a	  brain	   gain	  mechanism?	  Empirical	   evidence	   is	   scanty	   and	   several	   objections	  have	  been	  made	  
against	  the	  brain-­‐gain	  model,	  in	  particular	  that:	  the	  level	  of	  ability	  varies	  amongst	  highly-­‐educated	  individuals	  
and	   those	  with	  high-­‐ability	  will	   sooner	  or	   later	   find	  an	  opportunity	   to	  emigrate	  and	   leave	  behind	  only	   those	  
with	  low	  abilities;	  not	  only	  highly	  educated	  but	  also	  low	  educated	  individuals	  emigrate,	  making	  incentives	  for	  
acquiring	   education	   weaker	   in	   the	   reality	   than	   in	   the	   model.xv	   Another	   form	   of	   human	   capital	   building	   is	  
through	  social	  or	  ideational	  remittances.	  Since,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  migrants	  are	  exposed	  to	  a	  different	  culture	  in	  
destination	   countries	   and,	   on	   the	   other,	   they	   continue	   to	   exchange	   with	   their	   community	   of	   origin,	   it	   was	  
found	  that	  migrants	  are	  conveyors	  of	  models	  and	   ideas	  prevailing	   in	  the	  receiving	  society	  to	  non-­‐migrants	   in	  
the	   sending	   society.	   There	   is	   some	   evidence	   that	   the	   high	   value	   placed	   on	   education	   is	   among	   the	   ideas	  
transmitted.xvi	  
	  
A	  third	  question	  is	  whether	  skills	  lost	  through	  emigration	  are	  a	  scarce	  resource	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin.	  Higher	  
education	   varies	   in	   quantity	   and	   quality	   throughout	   the	   world;	   so	   does	   the	   employment	   of	   highly-­‐skilled	  
workers.	   After	   decades	   of	   considerable	   efforts	   and	   investment	   in	   education	   by	   families	   and	   governments,	   a	  
number	  of	  developing	  countries	  now	  suffer	  a	  brain	  waste:	  i.e.	  high	  unemployment	  among	  young	  people	  with	  
university	  education,	  and	  often	  with	  a	  diploma,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  mismatches	  between	  education	  and	  employment.	  
Therefore,	  the	  quantity	  of	  education	  exported	  through	  emigration	  does	  not	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  brain-­‐drain	  
phenomenon,	  if	  the	  quality	  of	  education	  and	  its	  employability	  at	  home	  are	  not	  accounted	  for.	  	  
	  
Middle	  Eastern	  and	  North	  African	  countries	  provide	  an	  illustration	  of	  this	  global	  trend.	  Unemployment	  rates	  of	  
university	   graduates	   reach	   two-­‐digit	   levels	   across	   the	   entire	   region:	   	   20.4%	   in	  Morocco	   at	   the	   end	   of	   2011;	  
20.3%	   in	   Algeria	   in	   2010;	   29.2%	   in	   Tunisia	   in	   2011	   and	   34.2%	   in	   2012;	   20.1%	   in	   Egypt	  mid-­‐2011;	   27.2%	   in	  
Palestine	   in	   2012;	   16.0%	   in	   Jordan	   in	   2012;	   and	   11.4%	   in	   Lebanon	   in	   2009.xvii	   Moreover,	   a	   striking	   shift	   in	  
unemployment	   from	  the	  bottom	  to	   the	   top	  of	   the	  educational	   ladder	  has	  occurred	  as	   shown	   in	  Figure	  8	   for	  












education.	  With	  the	  spread	  of	  school	  education	  this	  category	  shrank	  as	  did	  unemployment	  among	  them;	  those	  
with	  no	  school	  education	   today	  do	  not	  have	   the	  necessary	  means	   to	  survive	  unemployment.	  This	  great	   shift	  
from	  illiterate	  to	  graduate	  unemployment	   is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  process	  by	  which	  education	  has	  developed	  faster	  
than	   the	   opportunities	   it	   offered.	   In	  Morocco,	   an	   Association	   of	   Unemployed	   Graduates	  was	   established	   in	  
1991.xviii	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  the	  emigration	  of	  highly	  educated	  individuals	  is	  a	  safety	  valve	  as	  much	  as	  a	  drain.	  	  
	  
Moreover,	   at	   the	   world’s	   level,	   highly-­‐educated	   individuals	   have	   today	   become	   four	   times	   more	   likely	   to	  
emigrate	   than	   low-­‐educated	  workers.	   Taking	   a	   global	   perspective,	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   focus	   on	   only	   the	   origin	  
countries,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  highly-­‐skilled	  migration	  enhances	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  receiving	  population	  and	  gains	  




Figure	  8:	  Unemployment	  rate	  among	  illiterates	  and	  graduates	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia	  1980-­‐2011	  
	  
Source:	   Philippe	   Fargues	   and	   Alessandra	   Venturini	   (Ed.),	   Migration	   from	   North	   Africa	   and	   the	   Middle	   East	   -­‐	   Skilled	  
Migrants,	  Development	  and	  Globalisation,	  2015,	  London,	  I.B.	  Tauris	  	  
	  
	  
From	   an	   ethical	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   question	   is	   how	   to	   strike	   a	   balance	   between	   individual	   freedom	   and	  
individuals’	  debt	  to	  their	  country.	  Blaming	  highly-­‐educated	  migration	  from	  poor	  countries	  for	  hampering	  their	  
development	  logically	  translates	  into	  simple	  policy	  recommendations:	  for	  poor	  countries	  to	  limit	  or	  forbid	  the	  
emigration	  of	  highly	  educated	  people	  (in	  the	  name	  of	  national	   interest)	  and	  for	  rich	  countries	  to	   limit	  or	  ban	  
their	   immigration	   (in	   the	  name	  of	  ethical	   recruitment),	   in	  brief	  controlling	  migration	  at	  exit	  and	  entry.xx	   	  But	  
would	  such	  policies	  be	  fair?	  Based	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  empirical	  evidence	  on	  1)	  a	  direct	  adverse	  effect	  that	  
highly	   educated	   migration	   would	   have	   on	   a	   country’s	   development	   and	   2)	   a	   positive	   impact	   of	   restrictive	  





























freedom	  is	  consubstantial	  to	  developmentxxi	  and	  must	  apply	  to	  migration	  choices	  which	  are	  part	  of	  individuals’	  
agency.xxii	   	   It	   was	   also	   rightly	   noted	   that	   those	   advocating	   restrictions	   on	   the	   mobility	   of	   tertiary-­‐educated	  
Africans	  would	  never	  accept	  limitations	  on	  their	  own	  mobility.xxiii	  	  
	  
A	  last	  considerations	  questions	  the	  level	  of	  education	  and	  skills	  that	  is	  really	  transferred	  through	  migration?	  A	  
Moroccan	   engineer	   working	   in	   Canada	   will	   not	   represent	   the	   same	   education	   and	   skill	   package	   being	  
transferred	   from	   Morocco	   to	   Canada	   if	   the	   engineer’s	   tertiary	   education	   and	   diploma	   were	   gained	   after	  
departure,	  once	  established	  in	  Canada.	  ‘Where	  did	  education	  take	  place?’	  and	  ‘were	  skills	  mainly	  acquired	  in	  
the	   source	   or	   in	   the	   host	   country?’	   are	   therefore	   important	   questions	   when	   evaluating	   the	   existence	   and	  
magnitude	  of	  any	  brain	  drain.	  They	  are	  all	  the	  more	  relevant	  since	  the	  global	  circulation	  of	  university	  students	  
has	  recently	  gained	  tremendous	  momentum.	  Unfortunately,	   large	  datasets	  combining	  individuals’	  histories	  of	  
mobility	  and	  education	  are	  not	  available	  and	  the	  question	  remains	  largely	  unanswered.xxiv	  What	  we	  have	  seen	  
on	  age	  at	  education	  and	  age	  at	  migration	  in	  the	  life	  cycle	  of	  individuals	  (53%	  of	  all	  immigrants	  in	  the	  EU	  arrive	  
before	  28	  years	  of	  age;	   see	  above	  Figure	  2	  and	  Table	  3)	   suggests	   that	  a	   large	  proportion	  of	  highly-­‐educated	  
migrants	  have	  gained	  at	  least	  the	  last	  phase	  of	  their	  education	  (university)	  after	  migration.	  	  
	  
	  
Migrants’	  children	  educated	  in	  the	  origin	  countries	  
Labour	  migration	   is	   in	  most	   cases	  driven	  by	   a	  will	   to	   improve	   the	   living	   conditions	  of	   a	   family.	   Either	   family	  
members	  migrate	   together	  with	  or	   shortly	  after	   the	  breadwinner	  or	   they	   stay	   in	   the	  home	  country.	  The	   last	  
situation	  is	  the	  most	  frequent	  in	  temporary	  migration	  schemes	  as	  well	  as	  in	  long-­‐term	  migration	  before	  family	  
reunion	  takes	  place.	  Remitting	  money	  is	  therefore	  the	  true	  motive	  behind	  such	  migrations.	  Money	  remitted	  is	  
mainly	  used	  to	  increase	  consumption	  levels,	  to	  enhance	  the	  social	  status	  of	  the	  family	  and	  to	  invest	  in	  housing,	  
but	  also	  to	  improve	  the	  family’s	  human	  capital	  in	  terms	  of	  access	  to	  health	  and	  education.	  To	  what	  extent	  does	  
the	   emigration	   of	   the	   breadwinner	   contribute,	   through	   remittances	   and	   other	  mechanisms,	   to	   improve	   the	  
quantity	   and	   quality	   of	   school	   education	   of	   their	   children	   left	   behind?	   This	   is	   a	   much-­‐debated	   issue	   and	  
research	  findings	  seem	  context-­‐specific	  rather	  than	  universal,	  and	  mostly	  inconclusive.	  
	  
Remittances	  are	  considered	  to	  help	  poor	  families	  to	  lighten	  budget	  constraints	  that	  hamper	  education,	  and	  to	  
afford	   the	   direct	   costs	   of	   enrolment	   (school	   expenses,	   transportation,	   etc.)	   as	   well	   as	   its	   opportunity	   costs	  
(enrolled	  children	  cannot	  enter	  the	  labour	  market	  and	  earn	  an	  income).	  At	  country	  level	  remittances,	  which	  are	  
in	   a	   number	   of	   developing	   countries	   among	   the	   largest	   sources	   of	   external	   income,	   raise	   the	   level	   of	  
investments	   in	  education	  as	  well	   as	   the	   various	  positive	  externalities	  education	  brings	   to	   long-­‐run	  economic	  
development	  and	  human	  progress.	  It	  this	  sense,	  “migration	  is	  development”.xxv	  	  
	  
Evidence	  of	  education	  fostered	  by	  remittances	  through	  the	  likelihood	  of	  enrolment	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  early	  
dropout	  were	  actually	  found	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts.	  xxvi	  Girls	  may	  benefit	  more	  than	  boysxxvii.	  It	  was	  also	  found	  
that	   financial	   shocks	   in	   the	   origin	   country,	   such	   as	   the	   devaluation	   of	   its	   currency	   and	   the	   correlative	  
appreciation	  of	  migrant	  remittances,	  do	  not	  boost	  consumption	  as	  much	  as	  investments	  and	  the	  accumulation	  
of	   human	   capital.xxviii	   	  Moreover,	   as	   already	   indicated,	   a	   process	   of	   ideational,	   or	   educational	   remittances	   is	  
triggered	  by	  which	  migrants	  transfer	  to	  their	  communities	  of	  origin	  pro-­‐education	  values	  they	  are	  exposed	  to	  in	  













But	  other	  evidence	  points	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  and	  suggests	  that	  migration	  produces	  a	  number	  of	  adverse	  
effects	   on	   education	   in	   the	   origin	   country.	   The	   emotional	   problems	   resulting	   from	   the	   long	   separation	   of	  
children	  from	  one	  or	  both	  of	  their	  parents	  can	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  educational	  outcomes.xxix	  Moreover,	  
in	  contexts	  where	  migration	  is	  mostly	  low-­‐skilled,	  it	  may	  incite	  children	  to	  regard	  migration	  as	  a	  more	  efficient	  
avenue	  to	  success	  than	  education,	  and	  a	  culture	  of	  emigration	  may	  develop;	  why	  should	  one	  make	  efforts	  and	  
spend	  time	  and	  money	  to	  gain	  a	  diploma	  if	  migrating	  brings	  a	  bigger	  income?xxx	  	  
	  
	  
Migrants	  at	  school	  in	  the	  destination	  countries	  
With	  migrant	  flows	  and	  movements	  of	  family	  reunion	  gaining	  momentum	  in	  recent	  decades,	  the	  proportion	  of	  
students	  with	   an	   immigrant	   background	   has	   significantly	   increased	   in	   the	   primary	   and	   secondary	   schools	   of	  
many	   migrant-­‐receiving	   countries.	   PISA	   surveys	   reveal	   that	   between	   2006	   and	   2015	   at	   the	   age	   of	   15,	   this	  
proportion	  has	   increased	  from	  9.4%	  to	  12.5%	  on	  average	   in	  OECD	  countries	   (Table	  7).xxxi	  The	  situation	  varies	  
greatly	   from	  country	   to	   country	  within	   the	  OECD.	   	   Spectacular	   increases	  were	   recorded	   in	   countries	   such	  as	  
Luxembourg	  (from	  36.%	  to	  52.0%),	  Switzerland	  (from	  22.4%	  to	  31.1%),	  the	  United	  States	  (from	  15.2%	  23.1%),	  
the	  United	  Kingdom	  (from	  8.6%	  to	  16.7%),	  Ireland	  (from	  5.6%	  to	  14.4%),	  Italy	  (from	  3.8%	  to	  8.0%),	  and	  Spain	  
(from	   6.9%	   to	   11.0%).	   In	   other	   countries	   the	   proportion	   of	   migrants	   has	   stagnated,	   for	   example	   in	   France	  
(13.0%	  in	  2006	  and	  13.2%	  in	  2015)	  or	  even	  decreased	  (from	  23.0%	  to	  17.5%	  in	  Israel).	  The	  few	  data	  available	  
outside	  OECD	  show	  contrasted	  situations,	  from	  a	  slight	  decrease	  in	  Russia	  (from	  8.7%	  to	  6.9%)	  to	  what	  could	  
be	  a	  world	  record	  in	  Qatar	  where	  persons	  with	  an	  immigrant	  background	  at	  age	  15	  are	  now	  a	  majority	  (from	  
40.5%	  in	  2006	  to	  55.2%	  in	  2015).	  
	  
	  
Table	  7:	  Proportion	  of	  students	  with	  an	  immigrant	  background	  in	  2006	  and	  
2015	  -­‐	  OECD	  average	  
Origin	  of	  the	  students	   2006	   2015	   Change	  	  
2006-­‐2015	  
Non-­‐immigrant	   90,6%	   87,5%	   -­‐3,1%	  
Immigrants	   9,4%	   12,5%	   3,1%	  
Second	   generation	  
immigrants	  
5,0%	   7,1%	   2,1%	  
First	  generation	  immigrants	   4,4%	   5,4%	   1,0%	  
Source:	   OECD	   (2016),	   PISA	   2015	   Results	   (Volume	   I):	   Excellence	   and	   Equity	   in	  
Education,	  PISA,	  OECD	  Publishing,	  Paris.	  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264266490-­‐
en	  	  
	  
How	   do	   secondary-­‐school	   students	   with	   a	  migrant	   background	   perform	   at	   school,	   compared	   to	   natives?	   In	  
OECD	  countries	  and	  the	  EU	  member	  states	  in	  particular,	  the	  former	  are	  disadvantaged:	  their	  average	  scores	  are	  
lower	  and	  dropout	  rates	  are	  higher.	  A	  number	  of	  reasons	  explain	  their	  low	  scores	  in	  relative	  terms.	  The	  migrant	  












with	   limited	  exposure	   to	   the	  host	   society’s	   culture,	   speaking	   the	  origin	  country’s	   language	  at	  home,	  and	  not	  
benefitting	   from	   parental	   teaching	   support	   are	   amongst	   the	   best	   documented	   factors	   of	   weak	   school	  
performance.	   As	   shown	   in	   Table	   7,	   the	   migrants’	   disadvantage	   at	   school	   is	   particularly	   marked	   in	   the	   first	  
generation	   (when	   the	   students	   themselves	   are	   born	   abroad)	   and	   diminishes,	   but	   still	   persists	   in	   the	   second	  
generation.	   However,	   once	   controlling	   for	   differences	   in	   the	   family’s	   social	   status,	   the	   difference	   between	  
migrants	  and	  non-­‐migrants	  is	  halved	  but	  still	  persists	  (20	  points	  score	  see	  Table	  8).	  	  
	  
Table	  8:	  Performance	   in	   science	  of	   students	  with	  an	   immigrant	  background	  compared	  
with	  non-­‐migrants	  in	  OECD	  countries	  in	  2015*	  
Score	   differences	   between	   non-­‐
immigrant	  students	  and	  






Before	   accounting	   for	   students’	  
socio-­‐economic	  status	  
43	   31	   53	  
After	  accounting	  for	  students’	  socio-­‐
economic	  status	  
31	   20	   40	  
*	  Average	  score	  of	  non-­‐migrant	  students	  =	  500	  
Source:	  PISA	  2016	  
	  
Apart	  from	  the	  factors	  at	  play	  at	  family	  level,	  the	  education	  system	  and	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  the	  host	  country	  
contribute	  to	  explain	  why	  students	  with	  an	  immigrant	  background	  are	  disadvantaged.	  Factors	  as	  diverse	  as	  the	  
spread	   of	   pre-­‐school	   education	   (strongly	   linked	   to	   the	   acquisition	   of	   language	   skills),	   the	   prevalence	   of	   the	  
single-­‐school	   (where	  migrant	  and	  non-­‐migrant	   students	  engage	  with	  each	  other	   in	   the	   classroom),	   or	   a	  high	  
level	   of	   income	   redistribution	   in	   the	   society	   are	   recognised	   to	  mitigate	   the	   impact	   of	   social	   inequalities	   on	  
education	  performance.xxxii	  In	  Germany,	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  a	  significant	  gap	  in	  the	  second	  generation	  is	  not	  
only	  due	  to	  social	  conditions,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  country’s	  education	  system:	  late	  entry	  age	  (6	  
years,	   when	   much	   of	   the	   child’s	   development	   has	   already	   taken	   place)	   and	   half-­‐day	   pattern	   that	   reduces	  
interaction	  with	  teachers.xxxiii	  
	  
At	   this	   stage,	   a	   word	   must	   be	   said	   about	   language	   diversity,	   which	   lies	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   debate.	   While	  
practising	  the	  language	  of	  the	  origin	  country	  within	  the	  family	  can	  turn	  into	  either	  a	  handicap	  or	  an	  asset,	  it	  is	  
regarded	  in	  most	  Western	  countries	  as	  a	  handicap	  at	  school.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  children’s	  cognitive	  development	  
that	  the	  foreign	  language	  would	  permit	  is	  neglected.xxxiv	  	  Dropout	  rates	  in	  OECD	  countries	  are	  generally	  higher	  
among	  migrants	  than	  natives	  and	  increase	  with	  age	  at	  arrival,	  a	  fact	  that	  points	  to	  weak	  language	  acquisition	  as	  
a	   strong	   factor.xxxv	   The	  Programme	   for	   International	  Assessment	  of	  Adult	   Competencies	   (PIAAC)	   provides	   an	  
adult	   literacy	   indicator	   based	   on	   tests	   of	   the	   respondents’	   ability	   to	   find	   information	   in	  written	  material	   of	  
varying	  complexity.	   In	  all	   the	  countries,	   immigrant	  adults	  have	   lower	   literacy	  skills	  than	  natives.xxxvi	  The	  study	  
does	   not	   compare	   the	   parents’	   literacy	   scores	  with	   the	   school	   performances	   of	   their	   children,	   but	   one	   can	  
reasonably	  assume	  that	  there	  is	  a	  link.	  	  
	  
Another	  way	  of	   looking	  at	  multilingualism	  would	  be	  possible,	  however.	  Through	   immigration,	   languages	   that	  












Arabic	   speakers	   in	   the	   EU;	   three	  million	   Turkish;	   one	  million	   Chinese	   and	   Russian,	   etc.	   Some	   of	   these	   new	  
languages	   are	   in	   use	   in	  more	   than	   one	   European	   state	   and	   even	   across	   the	   entire	   European	   Union.	   In	   this	  
sense,	   they	  have	  become	  European	   languages.	  But,	  at	   the	  same	  time,	   they	  are	  minority	   languages.	  They	  are	  
spoken	   in	   families	  and	   in	  circles	  of	   friends	   sharing	  a	  common	  origin:	  but	   they	  are	   rarely	   shared	  beyond	   this.	  
Moreover,	  they	  are	  often	  viewed	  as	  a	  handicap	  at	  school	  and	  seldom	  taught.	  For	  example,	  in	  France	  in	  2014,	  
2,111	  foreign	  language	  posts	  were	  created:	  2,092	  teachers	  for	  EU	  languages	  (mostly	  English);	  15	  for	  Chinese;	  2	  
for	  Russian;	  2	  for	  Arabic;	  and	  none	  for	  Turkish.	  In	  many	  cases,	  speaking	  these	  languages	  is	  perceived	  negatively	  
by	  society;	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  markers	  of	  low	  integration,	  and	  speaking	  a	  foreign	  language	  can	  become	  a	  source	  
of	  shame	  for	  migrants.	  	  	  But	  if	  one	  considers	  other	  dimensions	  of	  integration,	  the	  handicap	  may	  be	  turned	  into	  
an	   asset.	   For	   example,	   it	   can	   be	   a	   collective	   asset	   for	   the	   host	   society	   if	   that	   language	   is	   used	   to	   extend	  
business	  activities	  to	  foreign	  markets	  (Arab	  States;	  Turkey,	  Russia,	  China…);	  to	  enhance	  security	  (intelligence,	  
phone	  taping…);	  to	  enrich	  cultural	  production,	  etc.	  	  
	  
A	   sensitive,	   policy-­‐relevant	   question	   is	   whether	   the	   presence	   of	   immigrant	   students	   in	   the	   classroom	   is	  
detrimental	  to	  native	  students.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  claim	  of	  populist,	  anti-­‐immigration	  parties	  in	  the	  West,	  where	  
school	  segregation	  is	  on	  the	  rise	  in	  large	  migrant-­‐receiving	  cities.	  In	  OECD	  countries,	  in	  neighbourhoods	  with	  a	  
high	   concentration	   of	   migrants,	   non-­‐migrant	   and	   migrant	   students	   are	   increasingly	   enrolled	   in	   separate	  
schools.	  This	  trend	  does	  not	  result	  from	  public	  policies	  which	  stick	  to	  the	  single-­‐school	  model,	  but	  from	  social	  
dynamics	   of	   avoidance.	   Because	   of	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   relative	   disadvantage	   of	   students	   with	   a	   migrant	  
background,	  under-­‐performing	  schools	  are	  developing	  in	  migrant	  neighbourhoods	  and	  tend	  to	  be	  deserted	  by	  
natives.	   In	  Amsterdam,	  The	  Hague,	  Rotterdam	  and	  Utrecht,	  14.1%	  of	  primary	  schools	  were	  classified	  migrant	  
under-­‐performing	  schools	   in	  2007.	  In	  these	  schools,	  teachers	  had	  to	  spend	  more	  time	  bridging	  linguistic	  gaps	  
between	  students	  than	  teaching	  the	  subject	  matter	  itself	  the	  course	  itself.xxxvii	  	  
	  
But	   what	   does	   evidence	   suggest	   about	   the	   way	   diversity	   in	   the	   classroom	   affects	   its	   average	   level	   of	  
performance?	  A	   statistical	   analysis	   of	   2009	  PISA	   raw	  data	  on	   school	   performance	   and	   social	   background	   for	  
nearly	   120,000	   students	   in	   the	   EU15	   revealed	   that	   while	   high	   numbers	   of	   immigrants	   are	   indeed	   found	   in	  
under-­‐performing	   schools,	   they	   are	  not	   causing	   the	   schools	   to	  underperform.	  As	   illustrated	  on	   Figure	  9,	   the	  
correlation	   disappears	   once	   controlling	   for	   socio-­‐economic	   characteristics	   of	   the	   students.	   It	   is	   the	   socio-­‐
























Figure	   9:	   Average	   differential	   in	   reading	   performance	   by	   country	   of	   residence	   and	   origin	   before	   and	   after	  
controlling	   for	   structural	   characteristics	   (*),	   2009	   (**)
Notes:	   (*)	   The	   following	   structural	  
characteristics	  were	  controlled	  for:	  sex,	  parents’	  educational	  and	  occupational	  level,	  PISA	  Index	  of	  home	  cultural	  possessions	  and	  type	  
of	  family;	  (**)	  No	  significant	  values	  are	  marked	  in	  blank.	  
Source:	  Sara	  Bonfanti	  and	  Anna	  Di	  Bartolomeo,	  Stereotype	  8:	  “Our	  children	  suffer	  from	  having	  immigrants	  in	  class”,	  in	  Philippe	  Fargues	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Score	  of	  children	  of	  mixed	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  Score	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  naVves	  












Figure	  10:	  Proportion	  of	  immigrant	  students	  at	  age	  15	  and	  average	  difference	  in	  science	  performance	  between	  
non-­‐migrant	  immigrant	  students	  at	  country	  level	  -­‐	  PISA	  2015	  
	  
Source	  of	  the	  data:	  PISA	  2016	  (see	  Annex	  B)	  
	  
	  
Another	  finding	  of	  the	  2015	  PISA	  surveys	  is	  worth	  mentioning:	  students	  with	  an	  immigrant	  background	  scoring	  
lower	  than	  natives	  constitute	  a	  predominant,	  but	  not	  universal,	  situation	  in	  OECD	  countries.	  	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  a	  
significant	  negative	  correlation	  between	  the	  percentage	  of	  students	  with	  an	   immigrant	  background	  and	  their	  
disadvantage	  compared	  with	  non-­‐migrants:	  when	  all	  countries	  are	  plotted	  on	  the	  same	  graph,	  the	  higher	  the	  
proportion	  of	  migrants	  the	  lower	  their	  disadvantage	  (Figure	  10).	  Moreover,	  in	  12	  of	  the	  65	  countries	  covered	  
by	  the	  survey	  migrants	  score	  better	  than	  natives	  (Table	  9).	  Half	  of	  these	  are	  countries	  in	  which	  the	  proportion	  
of	  migrant	  students	  is	  amongst	  the	  world’s	  highest:	  Qatar,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  Singapore,	  Macao,	  Australia	  
and	   Canada.	   In	   the	   last	   four	   countries,	   not	   only	   are	   non-­‐migrants	   scores	  well	   above	   the	  OECD	   average,	   but	  
migrants’	  scores	  are	  also	  even	  higher;	  an	  advantage	  that	  results	  from	  the	  points	  system	  that	  selects	  the	  most	  
educated	  migrant	  parents.	   In	  Qatar	  and	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  where	   instead	  nationals	  have	  much	   lower	  
average	  scores	   in	  science	   than	   in	  OECD	  countries,	   the	   fact	   that	  migrant	  students	  gain	  better	   results	  must	  be	  






















































Table	   9:	   	   Countries	   grouped	   by	   Percentage	   of	   Immigrant	   students	   and	   differences	   in	   science	  





Performance	  of	  migrants	  compared	  with	  non	  migrants	  
Migrants	   score	  
significantly	   below	  
natives	  (>	  30	  points)	  
Migrants	   score	   slightly	  
below	   natives	   (0	   to	   30	  
points	  score)	  
Migrants	   score	   better	  
than	  natives	  
Low	  (≤3%)	   Turkey,	   Thailand,	  
Malaysia,	   FYROM,	  
Kosovo,	  Peru,	  Chile,	  Czech	  
Republic,	   Dominican	  
Republic,	   Algeria,	   Tunisia,	  
Colombia,	  Brazil,	  Slovakia,	  
Bulgaria,	  Mexico,	  Japan	  
Uruguay,	   Georgia,	  
Lithuania	  
Hungary,	  Moldova	  
Average	   (5%	  
to	  12%)	  
Estonia,	   Italy,	   Spain,	  
Greece,	   Norway,	  
Netherlands,	   Denmark,	  
Slovenia,	  Iceland,	  Finland	  
Russia,	   Latvia,	   Argentina,	  
Portugal,	   Lebanon,	   Costa	  
Rica,	   Croatia,	   Trinidad	  
and	  Tobago	  
Malta,	   Montenegro,	  
Jordan	  
High	  (≥	  13%)	   United	   States,	  
Luxembourg,	   France,	  
CABA	   (Argentina),	  
Switzerland,	   Belgium,	  
Sweden,	   Austria,	  
Germany	  
Kazakhstan,	   Ireland,	   New	  
Zealand,	   Hong	   Kong,	  
Israel,	  United	  Kingdom	  
Qatar,	   United	   Arab	  
Emirates,	   Singapore,	  




Finally,	   there	   is	  a	   tendency	   for	  migrant	  communities	   to	  establish	   their	  own	  diaspora	  schools	  with	  or	  without	  
the	  support	  of	  their	  origin	  country’s	  government.	  The	  500	  French	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools	  managed	  in	  
135	  countries	  by	  the	  French	  Ministry	   for	  National	  Educationxxxix,	   the	  web	  of	  British	   international	  schools,	  and	  
Hispanic	  schools	   in	  the	  US	  belong	  to	  this	  category.	  This	   is	  also	  the	  case	  of	  the	  worldwide	  network	  of	  schools	  
created	  by	  the	  Hizmet	  movement,	  inspired	  by	  the	  doctrine	  of	  Islamic	  preacher	  Fethullah	  Gülen.	  In	  the	  United	  
States	  and	   in	  Western	  Europe,	  where	  Hizmet	  schools	  are	  mostly	  attended	  by	  children	  of	  Turkish	  origin,	   they	  
follow	  the	  local	  secular	  curriculum.xl	  Other	  diaspora	  schools	  operate	  in	  Gulf	  States	  such	  as	  Qatar	  and	  the	  United	  
Arab	   Emirates	   where	   foreign-­‐nationals	   are	   a	   demographic	   majority	   at	   school	   ages.	   	   Influential	   migrant	  
communities	  from	  India	  and	  other	  countries	  have	  opened	  private	  English-­‐speaking	  schools	  with	  an	  apparently	  












schools	   are	   attended	   by	   one	   third	   of	  UAE	   national	   students	   (Figure	   11).	  We	   lack	   the	   statistical	   evidence	   on	  
children’s	  performances	  in	  diaspora	  schools	  to	  evaluate	  their	  educational	  and	  social	  impact.	  
	  
	  
Figure	   11:	   Pre-­‐school,	   primary	   and	   secondary	   school	   students	   by	   nationality	   and	   educational	   sector	   in	   the	  	  
United	  Arab	  Emirates	  2015/2016	  
	  
Source:	   United	   Arab	   Emirates,	   Federal	   Competitiveness	   and	   Statistics	   Authority,	  
http://original.fcsa.gov.ae/EnglishHome/tabid/96/Default.aspx#refreshed	  	  	  
	  
	  
Educating	  refugees	  	  
Refugees	  represent	  8%	  of	  the	  international	  migrant	  stock	  globally.	  They	  are	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  vulnerable	  
groups	  of	  population.	  More	  than	  half	  of	  their	  school-­‐age	  children	  are	  de	  facto	  denied	  the	  fundamental	  right	  to	  
education.	  The	  UNHCR	  estimates	  that	  over	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  6	  million	  refugee	  children	  under	  its	  mandate	  are	  
out	  of	  school,	  a	  proportion	  that	  grows	  from	  50%	  at	  primary	  education	  level	  to	  +84%	  and	  99%	  respectively	  at	  
secondary	   and	   university	   levels.	   Out-­‐of-­‐school	   children	   are	   at	   high	   risk	   of	   becoming	   a	   lost	   generation.	   The	  
UNHCR	   stresses	   that	  more	   than	   half	   of	   them	   are	   found	   in	   just	   seven	   countries:	   Chad,	   DR	   Congo,	   Ethiopia,	  
Kenya,	   Lebanon,	   Pakistan	   and	   Turkey.xli	   Not	   all	   refugee	   children	   are	   exposed	   to	   the	   same	   circumstances,	  
however.	  Much	  depends	  upon	  time	  and	  place.	  	  
	  
According	   to	   time,	   three	   stages	   of	   a	   refugee’s	   life	   must	   be	   distinguished:	   the	   cross-­‐border	   movement,	   the	  
establishment	  in	  a	  first	  asylum	  country,	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  settlement	  in	  case	  return	  to	  the	  homeland	  does	  not	  
happen.	  In	  the	  first	  stage,	  during	  the	  journey	  from	  home	  to	  a	  safe	  shelter	  abroad,	  children	  are	  all	  kept	  out	  of	  
school.	   This	   can	   last	   anything	   from	   a	   few	   hours	   or	   days	   to	   several	   months.	   At	   best,	   in	   places	   of	   transit,	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efficient	   are	   they?	  We	  do	   not	   have	   sufficient	   data	   to	   know.	   	  Moreover,	  we	   have	   anecdotal	   accounts	   of	   the	  
physical	  and	  mental	  damage	  caused	  by	   the	   flight	   from	  home	  but	  no	  systematic	  data	   to	  assess	   its	  magnitude	  
and	  durable	  impact	  on	  the	  child’s	  education.	  
	  
The	  second	  stage	  starts	  at	  the	  moment	  when	  refugees	  reach	  a	  place	  of	  asylum	  where	  they	  can	  settle,	  at	  least	  
temporarily:	   the	   ‘first	   asylum	   country’.	   There,	   the	   situation	   of	   refugee	   children	   regarding	   education	   varies	  
enormously	   according	   to	   the	   country.	   Is	   it	   party	   to	   the	  1951	  Refugee	  Convention?	  Economically	  developed?	  
Politically	   stable?	  Culturally	  close	   to	   the	   refugee’s	  home	  country?	  Etc.	   	  All	   these	  aspects	   impact	   the	  quantity	  
and	  quality	  of	  school	  education	  available	  for	  refugees.	  Another	  important	  factor	  is	  the	  setting	  where	  refugees	  
are	  accommodated:	   is	   it	  a	  dedicated	  camp	  where	  they	  stay	  alongside	  fellow	  citizens	  (and	  can	  be	  educated	  in	  
their	  own	   language)	  or	   a	   village	  or	  urban	  neighbourhood	  where	   they	   live	  amidst	   local	   citizens	   (and	  must	  be	  
educated	  in	  the	  host	  country’s	  language)?	  A	  third	  stage	  may	  start	  when	  time	  passes	  and	  plans	  for,	  or	  hopes	  of	  
return	  gradually	  vanish:	  refugees	  can	  progressively	  integrate	  into	  the	  host	  society	  or	  be	  resettled	  and	  granted	  
long-­‐term	  status	  in	  a	  third	  country,	  or	  fall	  in	  protracted	  refugee	  situation.	  xlii	  
	  
A	  key	  question	  relating	  to	  the	  asylum	  country	  is	  whether	  it	  is,	  or	  is	  not,	  party	  to	  the	  1951	  Refugee	  Convention.	  
Indeed	   Article	   22	   of	   the	   convention	   stipulates	   that:	   “1.	   The	   Contracting	   States	   shall	   accord	   to	   refugees	   the	  
same	   treatment	  as	   is	   accorded	   to	  nationals	  with	   respect	   to	  elementary	  education.	  2.	   The	  Contracting	  States	  
shall	  accord	  to	  refugees’	  treatment	  as	  favourable	  as	  possible,	  and,	  in	  any	  event,	  not	  less	  favourable	  than	  that	  
accorded	   to	   aliens	   generally	   in	   the	   same	   circumstances,	   with	   respect	   to	   education	   other	   than	   elementary	  
education	   and,	   in	   particular,	   as	   regards	   access	   to	   studies,	   the	   recognition	   of	   foreign	   school	   certificates,	  
diplomas	  and	  degrees,	  the	  remission	  of	  fees	  and	  charges	  and	  the	  award	  of	  scholarships.”xliii	  	  	  
	  
A	  cursory	  glance	  at	  the	  world’s	  distribution	  of	  actual	  refugee	  populations	  and	  states’	  membership	  of	  the	  1951	  
Refugee	   Convention,	   reveals	   a	   patent	   global	   discrepancy	   between	   states’	   position	   regarding	   international	  
refugee	   law	  and	  their	  actual	  commitment	  to	  hosting	  (and	  often	  protecting)	  refugees.	   	  Almost	  half	   (46.6%)	  of	  
the	  world’s	   refugees	   (UNHCR)	  are	  staying	   in	  countries	   that	  are	  not	  signatories	  of	   the	  Refugee	  Convention	  or	  
that	  have	  a	  geographic	  limitation	  that	  de	  facto	  excludes	  them	  from	  its	  provisions	  (Table	  10).	  The	  world’s	  three	  
largest	  receivers	  of	  refugees	  are	  not	  parties	  (or	  with	  limitations)	  and	  among	  the	  countries	  that	  host	  more	  than	  
half	  a	  million	  refugees,	  only	  two	  are	  parties	  (Table	  11).	  Should	  UNRWA	  refugees	  be	  included	  in	  the	  counting,	  
























Table	  10:	  Distribution	  of	  refugees	  by	  the	  host	  country’s	  Refugee	  Convention	  status	  -­‐	  End	  of	  2015	  
Convention	   status	   of	  






Full	  party	   144	   8,601,289	   53.4%	  
Geographic	   limitation	  
to	   refugees	   from	  
Europe	  
4	   2,586,349	   16.0%	  
Not	  party	   53	   4,933,789	   30.6%	  
Total	   201	   16,121,427	   100.0%	  
Source	  of	  the	  data:	  UNHCR	  
	  
The	  Syrian	  refugee	  crisis	  that	  started	  in	  2011	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  Fleeing	  life-­‐threatening	  conditions	  in	  Syria,	  some	  
5	   millionxliv	   refugees	   have	   crossed	   their	   country’s	   border	   to	   find	   shelter	   in	   one	   of	   its	   neighbours:	   	   Turkey,	  
Lebanon,	   Jordan	   or	   Iraq.xlv	   These	   states	   are	   not	   parties	   to	   the	   Refugee	   Convention	   (or	   party,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
Turkey,	   but	  with	   a	   geographic	   limitation	   to	   Europe	   that	   excludes	   the	   refugees	   that	   Turkey	   actually	   receives	  
from	  the	  Middle	  East).	  They	  have	  a	  charity-­‐based,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  rights-­‐based,	  approach	  to	  the	  problem.xlvi	  	  
Refugees	  are	  admitted	  as	  “guests”:	  they	  enter	  legally,	  but	  for	  a	  limited	  period	  of	  time.	  During	  this	  period	  they	  
have	  little	  or	  no	  social	  and	  economic	  rights,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  education.	  Once	  their	  entry	  visa	  expires,	  they	  
lose	  the	  right	  to	  stay	  and	  they	  must	  choose	  between	  falling	  into	  limbo	  and	  trying	  to	  leave.	  So,	  what	  access	  to	  
schooling	  do	  Syrian	  children	  actually	  have	  in	  in	  these	  countries?	  
	  
Table	  11:	  Refugee	  Convention	  status	  of	  the	  countries	  hosting	  more	  than	  half	  a	  million	  (UNHCR)	  refugees	  -­‐	  End	  
of	  2015	  
Country	  	  of	  asylum	   Refugees	  (UNHCR)	   Convention	  status	  	  
Turkey	   2,541,352	   Limitation	   to	   refugees	  
from	  Europe	  
Pakistan	   1,561,162	   Not	  party	  
Lebanon	   1,070,854	   Not	  party	  
Iran	  	   979,437	   Party	  
Ethiopia	   736,086	   Party	  
Jordan	   664,118	   Not	  party	  
Kenya	   553,912	   Party	  













In	   Lebanon,	  where	   487,615	   Syrian	   children	   aged	   3-­‐18	   years	  were	   registered	  with	   the	   UNHCR	   at	   the	   end	   of	  
2016,	  enrolment	  rates	  were	  15%	  at	  pre-­‐primary	  school	  age	  (3-­‐5),	  47%	  at	  primary	  school	  age	  (6-­‐14)	  and	  4%	  at	  
secondary	  school	  age	  (15-­‐18).xlvii	  In	  Iraq,	  survey	  data	  in	  the	  governorate	  of	  Erbil	  suggest	  that	  around	  two	  thirds	  
of	  primary-­‐school	  age	  Syrian	  refugee	  children	  were	  formally	  or	  informally	  enrolled	  in	  2016	  but	  no	  one	  at	  high	  
school	  age.	  In	  the	  governorate	  of	  Sulaymaniyah,	  a	  similar	  situation	  was	  found	  with	  enrolment	  rates	  at	  primary-­‐
school	  level	  reaching	  54%	  for	  boys	  and	  61%	  for	  girls	  among	  Syrian	  refugees	  (vs.	  109%	  in	  the	  host	  communities),	  
and	   respectively	   2%	   and	   11%	   at	   high	   school	   level	   (vs.	   124%	   and	   119%	   in	   the	   host	   communities).xlviii	   The	  
situation	   seemed	   better	   in	   Jordan,	   where	   a	   72%	   enrolment	   rate	   of	   Syrian	   refugees	   was	   recorded	   at	   the	  
beginning	  of	  2016/2017.	  	  The	  main	  obstacles	  faced	  in	  this	  country	  by	  Syrian	  children	  of	  school	  age	  were	  out	  of	  
school	  were	  distance	  to	  school,	  underage	  employment	  in	  agriculture	  and	  services,	  and	  lack	  of	  regular	  residency	  
documents.xlix	  	  
	  
In	  Turkey	  at	  the	  end	  2016,	  an	  estimated	  60%	  of	  Syrian	  school-­‐age	  children	  were	  enrolled	  (grades	  1	  to	  12),	  two	  
thirds	  of	  them	  in	  regular	  Turkish	  schools	  and	  the	  rest	  in	  temporary	  education	  centres	  (TECs)	  set	  up	  for	  Syrian	  
refugees	   but	   teaching	   in	   the	   Turkish	   language.	   A	   40%	   increase	   in	   enrolment	   over	   just	   one	   year	   could	   be	  
attributed	   to	   a	   pro-­‐active	   policy	   of	   the	   Turkish	   Ministry	   of	   National	   Education	   towards	   Syrian	   refugees	   in	  
particular	  to	  the	  following:	  construction	  of	  schools;	  free	  provision	  of	   learning	  support	  materials;	  scholarships,	  
language	  programmes,	  etc.l	  Around	  one	  million	  Syrian	  refugees	  did	  not	  stay	  in	  the	  first	  asylum	  countries	  they	  
had	  found	  at	  the	  border	  of	  Syria,	  but	  travelled	  to	  Europe,	  most	  of	  them	  risking	  their	  lives	  smuggled	  by	  sea	  from	  
Turkey	   to	  Greece.	   	   The	  desire	  of	   a	   future	   for	   their	   children	   features	  prominently	   in	   the	   reasons	   that	  explain	  
their	   move.	   Indeed,	   the	   Charter	   of	   Fundamental	   Rights	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   stipulates	   that	   (Article	   14)	  
“Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  education	  …	  This	  right	  includes	  the	  possibility	  to	  receive	  free	  compulsory	  education”	  
and	  EU	  asylum	  law	  provides	  that	  minor	  children	  of	  asylum	  seekers	  must	  be	  enrolled	  3	  months	  after	  the	  asylum	  
claim	  was	  lodged.	  
	  
Integrating	  refugee	  children	   in	  the	  host	  country’s	  schools	   is	  at	   the	  same	  time	  a	  solution	  and	  a	  problem,	  as	   it	  
requires	  strong	  accompanying	  measures.	  Acquiring	  proficiency	  in	  the	  teaching	  language	  of	  the	  host	  country	  is	  
an	  overwhelming	  issue	  given	  that	  refugees	  are	  not	  native	  speakers.	  Intensive	  language	  courses	  are	  therefore	  a	  
necessity,	   but	   a	   time-­‐	   and	   resource-­‐consuming	   condition	   of	   success.	   Moreover,	   language	   is	   not	   the	   only	  
problem.	   Because	   refugees	   hope	   to	   return	   home	   and	   their	   presence	   in	   a	   country	   of	   asylum	   is	  meant	   to	   be	  
temporary,	  the	  choice	  of	  what	  to	  teach	  them	  is	  a	  strategic	  question.	  What	  curriculum	  should	  apply:	  that	  of	  the	  
host	   country	   or	   of	   the	   home	   country?	   Put	   in	   other	   terms,	   should	   education	   aim	   at	   local	   integration	   or	   at	  
smooth	   repatriation?	   It	   becomes	   a	   burning	   issue	   in	   the	   refugee	   status	   determination	   period,	   when	   neither	  
refugee	  families	  nor	  the	  public	  administration	  know	  what	  response	  will	  be	  given	  to	  asylum	  claims.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  a	  word	  must	  be	  said	  about	  protracted	  refugee	  situations.	  Refugees’	   long-­‐term	  settlement	  with	  no	  full	  
integration	  can	  indeed	  produce	  a	  variety	  of	  outcomes,	  from	  widespread	  destitution	  to	  unexpected	  educational	  
benefits.	  Let	  us	   focus	  only	  on	  the	   last	  case.	  A	   first	  example	  shows	  that	   refugee	  children	  can	  receive	  a	  better	  
education	  in	  their	  country	  of	  asylum	  than	  what	  was	  available	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin.	  From	  the	  1980s,	  to	  the	  
early	  2000s,	   Iran	   received	  3	   to	  4	  million	  Afghan	  refugees	   fleeing	  occupation	  and	  civil	  war	   in	   their	  homeland.	  	  
Half	  of	  them	  still	   live	   in	   Iran.	  A	  quick	  comparison	  of	  old	  (30	  years	  and	  over	   in	  2005)	  and	  young	  (15-­‐29	  years)	  
generations-­‐-­‐the	   first	   grown	   up	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   the	   second	   in	   Iran-­‐-­‐eloquently	   shows	   the	   educational	  












Interviewed	   refugees	   stress	   the	   better	   quality	   of	   education	   in	   Iran	   compared	  with	   Afghanistan	   (e.g.	   schools	  
accessibility,	  size	  of	  classes,	  teaching	  methods,	  etc.).li	  	  	  
	  
The	  most	  protracted	   refugee	   situation,	  which	   is	   that	  of	  Palestinians	  under	   the	  mandate	  of	  UNRWA,	  offers	   a	  
second	  example.	  After	  they	  lost	  their	  land	  and	  most	  of	  their	  physical	  capital,	  Palestinian	  refugees	  had	  no	  better	  
long-­‐term	   strategy	   than	   building	   strong	   human	   capital.	   International	   aid	   and	   the	   foresight	   of	   UNRWA	  were	  
instrumental	   in	  developing	  this	  strategy.	  From	  the	  early	  1960s	  until	  the	  present	  day,	  education	  of	  one	  of	  the	  
world’s	  youngest	  populations	  has	  continuously	  been	  the	  main	  activity	  of	  the	  international	  agency.lii	  As	  a	  result,	  
Palestinians	  are	  among	  the	  most	  educated	  people	  in	  the	  Arab	  region.	  	  
	  
	  
By	  way	  of	  conclusion:	  filling	  research	  gaps	  
In	  many	   regards,	   education	   and	   international	  migration	  work	   in	   synergy.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   education	   raises	  
both	  individuals’	  expectations	  and	  their	  opportunities,	  and	  their	  aspirations	  as	  well	  as	  their	  ability	  to	  fulfil	  them	  
in	  a	  variety	  of	  places.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  migration	  increases	  the	  material	  and	  non-­‐tangible	  resources	  that	  make	  
education	   desirable	   and	   attainable	   for	   the	   migrant	   and	   their	   children.	   Does	   this	   mean	   that	   sound	   policies	  
should	  work	  towards	  increasing	  education	  and	  migration	  in	  parallel?	  No,	  because	  there	  are	  notable	  differences	  
between	  the	  two.	  	  
	  
The	   first	   difference	   regards	   frequency:	   education	   tends	   to	   become	   universal,	   while	   international	   migration	  
remains	   exceptional,	   largely	   because	   no	   place	   is	   better	   than	   home	   for	   most	   people.	   The	   second	   regards	  
perception:	  education	  is	  (almost)	  universally	  praised	  and	  desired,	  while	  migration	  is	  often	  seen	  with	  reluctance	  
in	  migrants’	  host	  societies.	  Students	  are	  regarded	  as	  hopefuls,	  but	  immigrants	  as	  intruders.	  School	  education	  is	  
often	  vested	  with	  a	  mission	  of	  building	  national	  identity	  while	  immigration	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  identity.	  In	  
brief,	   the	   school’s	   open	   doors	   contrast	  with	  walls	   being	   erected	   to	   bar	   the	   route	   to	  migrants.	   In	   this	   highly	  
sensitive	  context,	  robust	  knowledge	  is	  needed	  for	  states	  to	  carry	  out	  informed	  policy-­‐making	  and	  for	  citizens	  to	  
construct	  their	  own	  unbiased	  views.	  For	  this,	  unanswered	  questions	  must	  be	  addressed.	  
	  
The	   first	   unanswered	   question	   we	   encountered	   is	   ‘how	  much	   education	   is	   transferred	   through	  migration?’	  
Comparing	   the	   distribution	   by	   education	   attainment	   of	   migrants	   to	   OECD	   countries	   on	   one	   side,	   and	   their	  
population	  of	  origin	  on	  the	  other,	  we	  were	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that,	  at	  world	  level,	  migrants	  to	  rich	  countries	  
are	  typically	  more	  educated	  than	  the	  average	  person	  left	  behind	  in	  the	  origin	  country.	   	  However,	  this	  finding	  
suffers	  several	  deficiencies.	  It	  reflects	  only	  part	  of	  migration	  because	  only	  OECD	  data	  provide	  migrants	  by	  origin	  
and	   level	   of	   education.	   Migrants	   to	   non-­‐OECD	   countries	   may	   well	   have	   a	   different	   educational	   profile.	  
Organising	  and	  analysing	  data	  on	  migrants	  to	  non-­‐OECD	  countries	  would	  disclose	  an	  important	  facet	  of	  global	  
migration.liii	   Moreover,	   a	   discrepancy	   between	   OECD	   and	   UNESCO	   statistics	   on	   population	   distribution	   by	  
educational	  attainment	  at	  country	   level	   limits	  the	  scope	  of	  any	  conclusions	  on	  where	  education	  is	  a	  driver	  of	  
migration	   and	  where	   it	   is	   not.	  Harmonising	   statistics	  would	  make	   it	   possible	   to	   better	   understand	  migrants’	  
selection	   by	   education.	   Finally,	   it	   is	   not	   only	   the	   quantity	   of	   education,	   but	   also	   its	   quality	   that	   matters.	  
Identifying	  which	  skills	  circulate	  on	  which	  routes	  and	  mapping	  the	  flows	  of	  international	  migration	  by	  type	  of	  
education	  would	  bring	  critical	  knowledge.	  












The	  second	  unanswered	  question,	  which	  is	  symmetrical	  to	  the	  previous	  one,	  is	  ‘how	  much	  education	  is	  gained	  
through	  migration?’	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  close	  to	  half	  of	  the	  international	  migration	  flows	  worldwide	  take	  place	  
at	   school	  or	  university	  age.	   Separating	   cases	  where	  education	   stops	  before	   (or	  at	   the	  moment	  of)	  migration	  
and	   cases	   where	   it	   continues	   after,	   in	   the	   destination	   countries,	   would	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   complex	   linkages	  
between	  international	  migration	  and	  human	  capital	  building	  at	  both	  origin	  and	  destination.	  	  It	  would	  allow	  the	  
balancing	  of	  the	  controversial	  issue	  of	  skills	  tapped	  (‘brains	  drained’)	  by	  migration	  with	  the	  largely	  overlooked	  
phenomenon	  of	  educational	  opportunities	  offered	  by	  migration.	  Ad	  hoc	  processing	  of	  school	  statistics	  should	  
make	  it	  possible	  to	  advance	  knowledge	  on	  this	  matter.liv	  	  
	  	  
The	  third	  unanswered	  question	  –	  ‘how	  much	  is	  non-­‐migrants’	  education	  affected	  by	  migration?’	  –complements	  
the	  other	   two.	  Migration	  produces	  externalities.	   Its	  education-­‐related	  benefits	  and	  costs	   for	   those	  who	  have	  
not	  migrated	  have	  been	   identified	  without	   any	   strong	   conclusions.	   The	  net	   result	   of	   pluses	   and	  minuses	   on	  
school	  enrolment	  in	  migrants’	  families	  and	  communities	  in	  origin	  countries	  has	  not	  been	  firmly	  established.	  In	  
the	  same	  vein,	  we	  cannot	  conclude	  what	  makes	  diversity	  of	  origins	  in	  the	  classroom	  an	  asset	  and	  what	  makes	  it	  
a	  liability.	  These	  two	  questions	  do	  not	  require	  new	  data	  as	  much	  as	  a	  new	  approach	  of	  existing	  data	  (household	  
surveys	  for	  the	  first,	  PISA	  surveys	  for	  the	  second).	  	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   nagging	   question	   of	   how	   to	  mitigate	   the	   educational	   consequences	   of	   the	   largest	   refugee	   crisis	  
since	   World	   War	   II,	   which	   is	   currently	   unfolding	   across	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   beyond,	   must	   be	   urgently	  
addressed.	  Creativity	  is	  needed	  to	  gather	  and	  analyse	  all	  kinds	  of	  data	  collected	  in	  countries	  of	  first	  asylum	  and	  

























Country Origin	   Migrants Country Origin	   Migrants Country Origin	   Migrants
Albania 7.9% 11.6% Ethiopia 0.8% 33.8% Peru 18.9% 31.9%
Algeria 8.0% 16.8% Fiji 12.3% 25.0% Philippines 21.6% 51.0%
Andorra 18.2% 32.3% Finland 31.3% 24.5% Poland 19.8% 23.7%
Anguilla 17.8% 33.5% France 24.1% 35.4% Portugal 10.9% 6.4%
Argentina 12.4% 35.9% Georgia 29.0% 24.3% Puerto	  Rico 23.4% 16.0%
Armenia 32.0% 35.3% Germany 23.7% 31.7% Qatar 20.3% 15.5%
Aruba 16.4% 43.4% Ghana 3.1% 36.0% South	  Korea 29.7% 49.6%
Australia 35.5% 48.5% Greece 20.4% 14.8% Moldova 20.9% 40.2%
Austria 18.0% 29.1% Guatemala 4.2% 9.8% Romania 11.9% 25.4%
Azerbaijan 21.5% 48.5% Guyana 0.2% 27.0% Russia 58.7% 31.7%
Bahamas 11.6% 33.6% Honduras 5.8% 12.5% Rwanda 3.6% 47.6%
Bahrain 15.2% 48.5% Hungary 18.6% 30.0% Saint	  Lucia 10.2% 22.1%
Bangladesh 4.2% 32.5% Iceland 28.9% 35.0% Samoa 3.9% 10.9%
Barbados 1.1% 28.2% Indonesia 6.6% 36.7% Saudi	  Arabia 16.0% 60.5%
Belarus 51.7% 25.6% Iran 18.3% 51.3% Senegal 2.7% 11.8%
Belgium 29.4% 33.1% Ireland 31.2% 26.3% Serbia	  and	  Montenegro15.6% 14.0%
Belize 8.4% 21.9% Israel 42.0% 43.0% Seychelles 7.7% 20.5%
Benin 2.2% 47.1% Italy 11.3% 12.0% Singapore 35.8% 45.2%
Bermuda 32.3% 38.3% Japan 34.5% 54.4% Slovak	  Republic 16.3% 13.0%
Bhutan 4.5% 30.5% Jordan 12.0% 45.1% Slovenia 21.2% 13.0%
Bolivia 20.5% 15.2% Kazakhstan 19.9% 19.6% South	  Africa 5.5% 54.7%
Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina7.7% 13.5% Kenya 2.2% 41.1% Spain 25.0% 18.0%
Brazil 10.4% 32.0% Kuwait 8.5% 60.4% Sri	  Lanka 13.9% 31.4%
Bulgaria 20.8% 14.4% Kyrgyzstan 16.2% 21.6% Suriname 3.9% 36.8%
Burkina	  Faso 1.0% 31.7% Latvia 24.2% 40.7% Sweden 28.7% 44.2%
Cambodia 1.5% 16.2% Lebanon 15.4% 34.1% Switzerland 33.7% 27.0%
Cameroon 1.4% 49.6% Lesotho 1.7% 65.6% Syria 5.8% 37.1%
Canada 45.3% 42.1% Lithuania 27.3% 22.7% Tajikistan 10.6% 23.2%
Cayman	  Islands 31.7% 18.6% Luxembourg 30.9% 26.7% Thailand 13.7% 36.0%
Chad 3.2% 43.7% Malaysia 8.3% 55.7% Macedonia 12.2% 9.4%
Chile 18.2% 33.7% Maldives 1.7% 43.4% Togo 2.6% 40.9%
China 8.8% 44.2% Mali 2.4% 13.5% Tonga 6.2% 11.3%
Hong	  Kong 17.3% 42.3% Malta 12.1% 14.7% Trinidad	  and	  Tobago9.7% 32.5%
Macau 13.3% 26.3% Mauritius 4.0% 26.7% Tunisia 12.4% 13.8%
Colombia 11.3% 28.0% Mexico 13.9% 6.7% Turkey 11.1% 7.5%
Costa	  Rica 20.6% 27.4% Mongolia 18.0% 55.9% Uganda 4.4% 42.6%
Croatia 16.1% 13.3% Mozambique 2.2% 27.9% Ukraine 38.1% 28.3%
Cuba 12.2% 24.7% Namibia 2.3% 58.2% United	  Arab	  Emirates18.0% 42.6%
Cyprus 29.9% 22.2% Netherlands 28.3% 34.8% United	  Kingdom 35.3% 23.0%
Czech	  Republic 15.5% 29.0% New	  Zealand 33.4% 31.2% United	  Rep.	  of	  Tanzania1.4% 44.4%
Congo,	  Dem.	  Rep.	  Of5.4% 44.1% Norway 30.1% 36.8% United	  States 39.0% 55.3%
Denmark 32.7% 37.7% Oman 14.0% 61.5% Uruguay 10.4% 28.2%
Dominica 5.0% 24.2% Pakistan 6.6% 34.9% Venezuela 17.4% 42.9%
Dominican	  Republic12.2% 13.8% Occup.	  Palestinian	  Terr.21.2% 46.3% Vietnam 6.7% 24.4%
Ecuador 11.5% 17.6% Panama 15.9% 35.8% Zambia 14.5% 54.9%
Salvador 9.6% 8.7% Paraguay 8.4% 27.0% Zimbabwe 1.5% 12.9%
Estonia 34.2% 35.8%
Percentage	  of	  population	  aged	  25	  years	  and	  over	  with	  a	  tertiary	  education	  (ISCED	  5	  of	  
higher)	  among	  immigrants	  in	  OECD	  	  and	  in	  their	  origin	  country	  -­‐	  ca	  2010
























































































































































































































Australia 25.0 512 514 523 505 -­‐2 -­‐10 7 -­‐5 -­‐14 5
Austria 20.3 510 440 447 428 70 63 82 46 38 57
Belgium 17.7 516 450 454 447 66 62 69 43 38 46
Canada 30.1 530 531 533 530 -­‐2 -­‐3 0 -­‐2 -­‐7 4
Chile 2.1 449 418 447 408 31 2 41 23 7 28
Czech	  Republic 3.4 495 463 477 450 32 18 45 24 2 45
Denmark 10.7 510 441 441 441 69 69 70 51 48 56
Estonia 10.0 539 507 507 510 32 32 29 31 31 36
Finland 4.0 535 452 464 443 83 71 92 65 50 77
France 13.2 506 444 456 419 62 50 87 32 21 51
Germany 16.9 527 455 461 434 72 66 93 50 42 76
Greece 10.8 461 417 424 404 45 38 58 23 18 30
Hungary 2.7 477 494 507 476 -­‐17 -­‐30 1 -­‐4 -­‐5 -­‐2
Iceland 4.1 478 398 424 387 80 54 91 66 43 76
Ireland 14.4 505 500 501 500 5 4 5 8 6 8
Israel 17.5 473 456 471 414 16 2 58 4 -­‐6 33
Italy 8.0 485 452 463 444 33 21 40 19 11 24
Japan 0.5 539 447 c c 93 m m 83 m m
Latvia 5.0 492 478 481 466 13 10 26 20 16 37
Luxembourg 52.0 505 464 463 466 41 42 39 13 13 13
Mexico 1.2 418 340 c 331 77 m 87 63 m 68
Netherlands 10.7 517 457 462 438 60 55 79 33 28 50
New	  Zealand 27.1 519 513 507 517 6 11 2 6 3 8
Norway 12.0 507 455 464 446 52 43 61 35 28 42
Portugal 7.3 503 488 503 475 16 0 28 16 7 23
Slovak 1.2 465 395 400 389 70 65 76 73 58 89
Slovenia 7.8 520 449 464 427 71 55 93 45 29 66
Spain 11.0 499 457 471 454 42 28 45 28 16 31
Sweden 17.4 508 438 454 417 70 54 90 49 37 64
Switzerland 31.1 527 464 462 467 63 65 60 41 40 41
Turkey 0.8 427 414 436 c 13 -­‐9 m 31 9 m
United	  Kingdom 16.7 516 493 503 485 23 14 32 18 7 28
United	  States 23.1 506 474 482 456 32 24 50 6 -­‐3 20
OECD	  average 12.5 500 456 469 447 43 31 53 31 20 40

























Before	  accounting	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students’	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status
After	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Science	  performance	  score
Difference	  between	  immigrant	  and	  non-­‐immigrant	  students













































































































































































































Albania 0.6 m m m m m m m m m m
Algeria 1.0 377 335 335 m 42 42 m 43 43 m
Brazil 0.8 404 338 335 342 66 69 62 66 66 66
Bulgaria 1.0 450 376 c c 74 m m 68 m m
CABA	  (Argentina) 17.0 485 423 429 414 62 57 71 16 10 24
Colombia 0.6 418 365 347 c 53 70 m 63 73 m
Costa	  Rica 8.0 422 401 398 409 20 24 13 6 7 5
Croatia 10.8 480 454 454 455 26 26 24 15 15 16
Cyprus* 11.3 434 433 447 428 1 -­‐13 6 -­‐4 -­‐12 0
Dominican	  Republic1.8 336 295 282 313 40 54 23 31 38 22
FYROM 2.0 387 362 375 335 25 12 52 29 14 61
Georgia 2.2 414 408 408 c 7 6 m 9 8 m
Hong	  King 35.1 529 516 518 513 13 11 16 3 1 3
Indonesia 0.1 405 c c c m m m m m m
Jordan 12.1 412 417 418 414 -­‐5 -­‐6 -­‐2 -­‐2 -­‐2 -­‐1
Kosovo 1.5 380 353 333 374 27 47 6 28 43 12
Lebanon 3.4 392 372 343 398 20 49 -­‐5 20 57 -­‐12
Lithuania 1.8 477 469 478 438 8 -­‐1 39 13 8 30
Macao	  (China) 62.2 519 535 536 535 -­‐17 -­‐17 -­‐17 -­‐22 -­‐22 -­‐21
Malta 5.0 468 501 472 514 -­‐34 -­‐4 -­‐46 -­‐12 5 -­‐19
Moldova 1.4 430 435 438 c -­‐5 -­‐8 m 4 -­‐1 m
Montenegro 5.6 412 423 425 420 -­‐11 -­‐12 -­‐8 -­‐4 -­‐5 -­‐2
Peru 0.5 398 367 c c 31 m m 33 m m
Qatar 55.2 377 458 427 470 -­‐82 -­‐51 -­‐93 -­‐81 -­‐54 -­‐92
Russia 6.9 489 480 481 478 10 8 11 7 6 9
Singapore 20.9 550 579 589 573 -­‐28 -­‐39 -­‐23 -­‐6 -­‐24 4
Chinese	  Taipei 0.3 533 c c c m m m m m m
Thailand 0.8 424 410 407 c 14 16 m -­‐3 5 m
Trinidad	  and	  Tobago3.5 432 403 381 432 29 51 0 28 48 1
Tunisia 1.5 390 340 330 c 50 60 m 55 62 m
United	  Arab	  Emirates57.6 394 474 461 482 -­‐80 -­‐67 -­‐88 -­‐79 -­‐68 -­‐86
Uruguay 0.6 437 431 c c 5 m m 18 m m
Argentina** 4.4 433 419 422 413 14 11 20 1 -­‐3 9
Kazakhstan** 13.0 457 455 457 449 2 0 8 0 -­‐1 3
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i United Nations 1998, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, 
Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1, Statistical Papers Series M, No. 
58, Rev. 1,New York, 1998, ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/58/Rev.1 
ii United Nations 2011, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International 
Migration Report 2009: A Global Assessment, New York, December 2011, ST/ESA/SER.A/316 




vi Ian Goldin, Geoffrey Cameron and Meera Balarajan 2011, Exceptional People; How Migration Shaped 
Our World and Will Define Our Future, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2011 
vii	  Two	  series	  are	  plotted	  on	  Figure	  3:	  before	  correction	  and	  after	  correction.	  Indeed	  two	  sources	  are	  used	  for	  this	  graph:	  
UNESCO	   (horizontal	   axis)	   and	  OECD	   (vertical	   axis).	   These	   two	   sources	   are	   not	   consistent	  with	   each	   other.	   In	   countries	  
covered	  by	  the	  two	  sources	  (i.e.	  	  OECD	  member	  states),	  the	  proportion	  with	  tertiary	  education	  provided	  by	  UNESCO	  was	  
found	   to	  be	  on	  average	  1.316	   times	  higher	   than	   the	   same	   indicator	  provided	  by	   the	  OECD.	   It	   is	  not	   clear	  whether	   this	  
discrepancy	   is	   due	   to	   different	   methodologies	   or	   different	   dates,	   but	   one	   might	   assume	   that	   the	   same	   average	  
discrepancy	  would	  have	  been	  found	  in	  non-­‐OECD	  countries	  if	  they	  had	  been	  included	  in	  the	  OECD	  dataset.	  	  Because	  only	  
the	  OECD	  dataset	  provides	  the	  proportion	  with	  tertiary	  education	  among	  migrants	  in	  OECD	  destination	  countries	  (vertical	  
axis),	   a	   correcting	   factor	   of	   1.316	   should	   be	   uniformly	   applied	   to	   this	   series	  when	   plotted	   against	   the	   proportion	  with	  
tertiary	  education	  among	  non-­‐migrants	   in	  the	  origin	  countries	  which	  only	  UNESCO	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  all	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  countries	  	  
(horizontal	  axis)	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  to	  make	  origin	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  destination	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